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Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war 
as a global insurgency.  Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides 
an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign.  This study is not 
intended to resolve the debate over whether the war on terrorism is an insurgency or not.  
Instead, it bypasses the debate to determine the utility of addressing the war on terrorism 
using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework.  Additionally, the 
recommendations from the analysis can be applied to strategic campaign planning, even 
if it is determined to be politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency.   
The study is broken down into five chapters: an introduction, explanation of Dr. 
McCormick’s Counterinsurgency model used for analysis, application of the model to a 
historical case, application to the war on terrorism, and conclusions.  The first half of the 
study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick’s model.  This 
is done by, first, providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a 
historical case: the insurgency in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982.  The 
second half of the study addresses the current U.S. lead war on terrorism.  The 
counterinsurgency model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda 
Network and the United States’ vision and mission for the conflict.  Ten 
recommendations for restructuring the U.S. strategic framework for approaching the war 
on terrorism are drawn from the analysis.  The final chapter addresses the utility provided 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it. 
William James 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to provide an alternative approach for analyzing the 
war on terrorism.  As Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow state in Essence of Decision: 
Alternative conceptual frameworks are important not only for further 
insights into neglected dimensions of the underlying phenomenon.  They 
are essential as a reminder of the distortions and limitations of whatever 
conceptual framework one employs.1 
Only by analyzing a phenomenon from an alternative perspective (preferably multiple 
alternative perspectives) can all the intricacies of a situation be understood.  This study 
will address one of the many alternative methods for analyzing the war on terrorism, in 
this case as a Global Insurgency.   
B. THESIS STATEMENT 
Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency will provide an 
alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign.  This study is not intended 
to resolve the debate over whether the war on terrorism is an insurgency or not.  Instead it 
is meant to bypass the debate and determine the utility of addressing the war on terrorism 
utilizing an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework.  Additionally, it may 
be politically unfeasible to address the war on terrorism as a global insurgency, but the 
counterinsurgency framework is still applicable for strategic campaign planning.   
C. PRELUDE TO INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II - The Counterinsurgency Model 
Dr. Gordon McCormick’s counterinsurgency (COIN) model2 is used to analyze 
the war on terrorism.  The model develops a symmetric view of the required strategic 
focus for both the insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success.  In this way the COIN 
                                                 1 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d 
Ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 8. 
2 Dr. Gordon McCormick is currently the Chair of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey California.  The Defense Analysis Department provides a Special 
Operations oriented curriculum sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
2 
model demonstrates how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail.  The model 
is broken down into five strategies available to the insurgent and COIN forces; with one 
overarching principal for the application of these strategies.  This chapter explains the 
model that is then applied to a historical case study and the war on terrorism.   
2. Chapter III - Hizballah: Examination of a Successful Insurgency 
The COIN Model is applied to the insurgency in Lebanon following the 6 June 
1982 invasion of Israeli forces into southern Lebanon.  This case study was selected 
primarily because of the influence Hizballah has had on Radical Islamist ideology and 
tactics.  The removal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from southern Lebanon proved to 
the people of the Middle East that Israel could be defeated.  Hizballah’s campaign 
provided a strategic and tactical framework for numerically weaker forces to counter 
organized conventional units.  This chapter analyzes the actions of both Hizballah and the 
IDF using Dr. McCormick’s COIN Model drawing conclusions from the analysis on the 
successes and failures of the two opposing forces.  The chapter also provides the analysis 
of a historical case study to illustrate the strategies and overarching principal of the 
model.   
3. Chapter IV - Global Insurgency 
This chapter will address the war on terrorism from the perspective of a global 
insurgency.  The main assumption is that the dynamics of the global insurgency parallel 
an intra-state insurgency.  Therefore, the tools utilized to analyze an intra-state 
insurgency will apply to the global insurgency.  The analysis is based on al Qaeda and the 
United States’ vision and mission for the current conflict.  Ten recommendations for 
restructuring the U.S. strategic framework for approaching the war on terrorism are 
drawn from the analysis.   
4. Chapter V - Conclusions 
The final chapter addresses the utility of applying Dr. McCormick’s model 
to the Global Insurgency.  The primary conclusion drawn from the analysis is that 
a shift in the main emphasis for the conduct of the war is needed.  The primary 
emphasis must shift to, and remain on, the population.  Rather then going after the 
network directly, the McCormick Model analysis points to the need to target the 
network’s support base and resources as the most effective method of defeating 
3 
the AQN.  Gaining popular support strengthens the Coalition’s ability to counter 
the AQN, while simultaneously draining the network of their ability to operate; 
their most basic and essential needs go unfulfilled and the network will fail to 

















II. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
The guerrilla’s operational challenge is, first, to provide the spark that sets 
the conflict in motion and, second, to serve as a conduit to channel the 
population’s revolutionary sentiments. 
Gordon H. McCormick3 
A. MCCORMICK’S COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
Dr. Gordon McCormick’s model is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency 
(COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent 
and COIN forces to achieve success.  In this way the counterinsurgency model can 
demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail.  The model’s 
strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the 
model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or 
COIN force.  The model was initially developed based in Dr. McCormick’s extensive 
studies in insurgency and specifically on his experiences in Peru studying the conflict 
between the Peruvian Government and Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path).  
The model depicts four key elements or players (described in section B below).  
There are also five mirrored strategies (described in section C below) available to both 
the IF and CF, as well as feedback mechanisms (described in section D below) for those 
forces.  Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the model.  Not depicted is the guiding 
principle for the application of the five strategies (described in section E below). 
B. THE PLAYERS  
1. The Insurgent Force 
The Insurgent Force (IF) is the group (individuals through “force in being”, 
depending on the time line of the insurgency) conducting or supporting operations to 
remove the current government or occupying force.  Insurgents are anyone that is either 
actively or passively supporting the insurgent movement; including, but not limited to, 
the    active    fighters,    supporting    clandestine   infrastructure (leadership,   auxiliary, 
                                                 3 Gordon H. McCormick, “People’s War,” in James Ciment (ed),  The Encyclopedia of International 
Conflict, Shocken Press, 1999. 
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underground), paramilitary forces, and trainers/advisors.  There is not always a clear 
distinction between the voluntary insurgent and those coerced into supporting the IF.   
 
Figure 1.   McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model (From: McCormick, 2003, Seminar 
in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) 
 
Distinguishing between the voluntary insurgent, the coerced supporter, and the innocent 
bystander is one of the most difficult obstacles (if not the most difficult) for the COIN 
force.  “They [insurgents] typically have sources of support among the local populace of 
the same ethnicity with whom their separatist goals (or appeals to blood links) may 
resonate.”4  Analysis using this model is applied to one central Insurgent Force and their 
countering COIN Force, but includes each group’s interaction with any potential 
supporting, rival, or competing insurgent/COIN forces.  An insurgent movement does not 
need to follow any specific ideology (Marxist/Leninist, Maoist, Democratic, Religious...), 
but the members must have similar ideologies and/or objectives, and follow the same 
leadership to be considered a single organization.  Often multiple organizations will be 
                                                 4Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International 
Security 27 (2003): 30-58. 
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involved in an insurgency, but different organizations are distinct in their beliefs, actions, 
leadership, and/or desired endstate.  For example, during the Cuban Revolution there 
were multiple organizations (Directorio Revolucionario, M-26-7, ANR, AAA...) all 
working to remove Batista from power, but each had their own independent view of how 
Cuba should look after the revolution. 
2. The Counterinsurgency Force 
The counterinsurgency force (CF) is the current government or occupying force in 
the region.  These are the forces on the ground that are in direct combat with the IF.  
There is normally a single force that is the lead in the COIN effort, but other troops, 
organizations, or countries can provide additional forces to augment the CF.  The CF 
must integrate all elements of national power: civil, military, diplomatic, informational, 
economic, and financial capabilities.  These forces include, but are not limited to: 
military, police, security forces, intelligence infrastructure, and trainers/advisors.  The CF 
is defined by the insurgent’s perceptions; if forces are present that believe they are not 
taking an active role in the COIN effort (i.e. peacekeepers or observers), but are 
perceived by the IF as influencing the situation, then those forces have become part of the 
CF.  The corollary is true of the CF defining the IF, but the CF normally has a greater 
“burden of proof” dictated by the media and international oversight.  The CF must clearly 
identify legitimate targets among insurgents that can often blend in with the local 
populace, while the IF can easily identify conventional COIN Forces by their large and 
obvious signature (uniforms, bases, vehicles…).  
3. The Population 
The Population consists of the non-combatants in the disputed region.  While 
support may be coerced out of the Population they are not considered insurgents until 
they provide additional support beyond that required to avoid reprisals.  For example, 
during the War in El Salvador the insurgents (and often government forces too) required 
water and tortillas from the Population.  Failure to provide this subsistence support was 
deemed to indicate affiliation with the opponent and would result in immediate reprisals.  
The people that provided this support were not considered combatants (pro-insurgent or 
pro-government) until support was provided above (more than water and tortillas) or 
below (not even water and tortillas) the base level.  When the people provide information, 
8 
early warning, take up arms, or any other form of active or passive support, they are 
choosing a side and are no longer non-combatants or members of the population. 
4. The International Community 
The International Community is made up of external nation states, international 
organizations, and other groups that are not functioning in a direct or indirect support role 
for the IF or CF.  Members of the International Community, similar to the population, 
remain “neutral” until they provide support to a side; once support is provided (or 
perceived to be provided) they become part of the IF or CF.  The International 
Community can introduce troops into a region without choosing sides, for example 
peacekeeping forces, and thus retain non-combatant status as long as their presence does 
not construe support for the IF or CF.  Maintaining the perception of neutrality can be a 
difficult task and members of the International Community can transition from external 
supporter to participant either intentionally or unknowingly.  For example, the Pakistani 
Military in Somalia was under the auspices of UN Peacekeeping and Humanitarian 
Assistance; while providing food to starving Somalis.  The UN forces viewed this as a 
neutral act which provided them sanctuary from attack.  The Somali warlord, Mohamed 
Farrah Aidid, viewed the distribution of food as a threat to his control over the population 
and ordered an ambush of a UN convoy killing 18 Pakistani soldiers.  The IF perception 
of the UN had shifted.  The UN Peacekeepers showed an influence that was not directed 
against the IF, but did have the indirect effect of undermining the IF authority and 
control.  This perceived influence in the eyes of the IF made the peacekeepers members 
of the CF and legitimate targets. 
C. THE STRATEGIES 
1. Strategy 1 – Gaining Support of the Population 
Strategy 1 is directed at gaining the support of the population.  The battle for 
popular support is critical during an insurgency; both the IF and CF need popular support 
for success.  The asymmetry of insurgent warfare derives from the forces’ different 
strengths and weaknesses, these differences - and thus needs - drive how the forces apply 
this strategy.  The insurgent force often has the initial advantage in popular support over 
the COIN force because the insurgent traditionally comes from or claims to be fighting 
for the Population. 
9 
Although the CF is strong in resources, personnel, and firepower, they normally 
lack specific intelligence on the IF.  Therefore, the CF needs popular support to gain the 
required intelligence to identify the IF and generate legitimate targets that support the 
overall campaign plan.  Indiscriminant assaults will cause collateral damage that will 
degrade popular support.   
Conversely, the IF can easily identify their opponent, but comparatively lack 
resources, personnel, and firepower.  The IF needs popular support to increase their 
resources and personnel, but more importantly their security.  The most valuable asset the 
population can provide is the security to move freely within the region - thus denying the 
CF its essential need for intelligence.  The population’s passive support gives the 
insurgent early warning of approaching COIN forces, providing time to hide or escape.  
This allows the insurgents the freedom to plan and conduct operations, and more 
importantly survive.  Active support is only a secondary contribution of the population.  
This can be seen in interviews of locals and IF members following the insurgency in El 
Salvador:  
While the provision of supplies and the movement of ordinance were 
important, the provision of military intelligence concerning the movement 
of government forces was the essential campesino contribution.5  
A small insurgency can sustain operations with the passive support of the population, 
allowing the organization to then focus on recruiting active supporters and increasing its 
size.   
Both the IF and CF fill different needs through popular support.  The population 
has the ability to neutralize the strengths and weaknesses between the IF and CF.  While 
these are significant contributions necessary to both forces, the most important 
contribution the population can provide is legitimacy of action.  Both the IF and CF 
require popular support to maintain the perceived legitimacy.  Legitimacy cannot be 
made it can only be granted by the population and international community.  The goal of 
the CF is to deny legitimacy to the IF (discrediting IF actions or underlying ideology as 
illegitimate), while maintaining its control.  The IF is attempting to diminish the CF 
                                                 5 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121. 
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legitimacy (either through provoking a military response, propaganda, demonstrating 
inability to provide security to the population, or other ways of undermining control), 
while establishing the legitimacy of its cause.  “An insurgent movement is a war for the 
people,”6 because the people provide legitimacy for the group they support.   
2. Strategy 2 - Disrupt Opponent’s Control Over the Population 
Strategy 2 is directed at disrupting the opponent’s control over the Population.  
Where Strategy 1 focuses primarily on gaining popular support, Strategy 2 focuses on 
preventing or interrupting your opponent’s control over the Population.  Strategy 1 is an 
attempt to actively gain support; Strategy 2 is more reactive or preemptive to deny 
support to the opponent.  The CF objective is to drive a wedge between the IF and the 
population they rely on, by de-legitimizing the IF and denying it access to the population 
and other resources in the operational area.  Conversely, the IF must attempt to de-
legitimize the authority of the current government and break/disrupt the control the CF 
has over the population and the resources the IF depends on for survival and success.  
Attempts at (or lack of) Strategy 1 can have implications on a force’s ability to execute 
Strategy 2.   
The IF has the advantage in Strategy 2.  The CF, in order to maintain legitimacy, 
must destroy the IF.  The IF only needs to survive to undermine the perceived control of 
the CF, and thus undermine its legitimacy.  As Michael Vlahos states: 
While the established and legitimate [Government] must have as their goal 
the destruction of the insurgent movement, the insurgency needs only to 
survive to deny the established authority its goal.  An establishment that 
cannot put down a direct challenge to its authority...is increasingly 
discredited... The longer they [the insurgent] survive the more their 
authority grows, and the weaker the strategic position of the establishment 
becomes.7 
The information war and perception management can be a critical aspect of 
Strategy 2.  Both the IF and CF should use and exploit the media as an “information age” 
force multiplier to gain support and spread the justification behind the forces actions.  To 
paraphrase Rohan Gunaratna in his article Defeating Al Qaeda: Instead of shying away, 
                                                 6 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 51. 
7 Michael Vlahos, Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam, (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Joint Warfare Analysis Department, 2002), 4. 
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public diplomacy must be used to develop transparency and accountability.8  Both sides 
can use the media and public diplomacy to gain support (Strategy 1) and to deny support 
to the opponent (Strategy 2).   
3. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against Opponent 
Strategy 3 is directed at striking the opponent to disrupt his operations, attrit his 
forces, and break his will to continue the struggle.  Effective use of Strategy 3 is limited 
by the degree of knowledge and understanding of the opponent.  The conventional CF’s 
large and obvious signature means the IF can easily identify the CF activities and 
locations.  This knowledge enables the IF to conduct assaults when and where they 
choose reducing the fear of collateral damage.  The CF on the other hand has to first gain 
necessary intelligence before it can conduct effective operations.  The IF defense against 
Strategy 3 is secrecy, denying the CF the ability to find and fix the insurgents.  The CF 
traditionally has ample capabilities to conduct direct assaults, but is limited by the 
availability of legitimate targets.  As previously discussed, indiscriminant assaults can be 
counterproductive to the overall COIN effort.  Conversely the CF is protected by strength 
and firepower, while the IF lacks the capabilities and size to deliver a decisive victory in 
a single blow.   
4. Strategy 4 - Disrupt Opponent’s Relations with the International 
Community 
Strategy 4 is the corollary to Strategy 2 as applied to the International 
Community.  This strategy focuses on denying the opponent international support.  As in 
Strategy 2, the CF objective is to drive a wedge between the IF and the International 
Community.  Similarly, the IF must attempt to disrupt any international support for the 
government or occupying force.  Both Forces require perceived legitimacy in order to 
obtain international support.   
5. Strategy 5 - Establish Relationships with the International 
Community 
Most conflicts, including civil wars, become battles for legitimacy and strong 
international backing can provide perceived legitimacy.  Outside of gaining nation-state 
support, international support can serve to level the strengths and weaknesses between 
                                                 8 Rohan Gunaratna, “Defeating Al Qaeda,” in Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the new Security 
Environment, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), 1-28. 
12 
the CF and IF.  The CF, with a firepower and troop strength advantage, is primarily 
concerned with nation-state support to gain legitimacy.  The IF can gain critical 
resources, training, and personnel from international support, whether from foreign 
governments, expatriates, or other external organizations.  The IF can also use 
international organizations to force further restrictions on the current government or 
occupying force.  For example the IF can manipulate Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO’s) to ensure COIN Forces follow international agreements concerning human 
rights, while the IF (being a non-state actor) does not receive similar oversight. 
D. FEEDBACK 
Feedback is critical for understanding the effects of IF and CF actions on popular 
and international perceptions.  The feedback connections allow both forces to asses the 
success or failure of their operations.  A military operation conducted flawlessly that only 
heightens animosity among the population, is an unsuccessful operation.  Forces must 
analyze the effects of their actions, and those of their opponents, and remain flexible 
enough to adjust operations to maximize friendly effects and minimize those of the 
opponent.  This may be initially easier for the IF because it traditionally is closely tied to 
population, but both sides must establish and maintain feedback mechanisms to asses 
their operations. 
E. THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE MODEL 
The driving principle behind the model is that both forces, IF and CF, must 
conduct every operation with consideration of how it will affect perceptions in the 
population and international community.  Following this principle, both forces must 
execute the strategies from the outside in; meaning that the main emphasis must be on 
Strategies 1 and 5.  Only by focusing on strategies 1 & 5 (gaining the support of the 
population and international community) can the required needs be addressed to 
effectively execute the other strategies.  This does not mean, for example, that direct 
action (Strategy 3) cannot be used, what it does mean is that direct action can only be 
used when it promises to produce a net benefit in popular and/or international support.  
The CF and IF will utilize all five Strategies to varying degrees throughout the conflict, 
but the center of gravity is primarily the population.   
13 
The IF may be forced in the initial stages to utilize a strictly direct action 
campaign.  Direct action by the IF shows the population that the insurgency exists, 
demonstrates that the CF can be resisted, produces the necessary attention required to 
then allow recruitment and expansion, and/or to force the CF to further alienate the 
population through operations conducted in the name of security/control.  A small 
insurgent force can maintain a strictly Strategy 3 focus, but it will never win the war.  
Sustained small attacks may preoccupy the government or occupying force, but without 
the population’s backing the insurgency will never seriously threaten the legitimacy or 
control of the CF.  The CF must also focus on popular support, because without it the 
region will require a permanent military/police presence.  If the CF does not gain popular 
support, the insurgents will remain active.  The best case scenario for the CF in this 
situation would be to maintain a permanent presence in the region, the worst case is that 
the IF discovers the strength of popular support and eventually grows until they achieve 


























III. HIZBALLAH9: EXAMINATION OF A SUCCESSFUL 
INSURGENCY 
The only way to fight a counterinsurgency is by “unconventional war” 
Where rank disappears and function takes over, the military is working 
efficiently.  Where function disappears and rank takes over the military is 
not working at all. 
     Robert Kaplan10 
 
A. INSURGENCY IN LEBANON 
If you mention the name Hizballah to most Americans, the suicide bombing of the 
Marine Barracks in Beirut is a common image.  There is a great deal of anti-western 
ideology exemplified in this common image, but once you get passed any cultural bias 
and take an objective look at Hizballah, you see a successful insurgent group that fought 
and defeated a far stronger professional military in Lebanon.  Without justifying, 
excusing, or defending Hizballah’s tactics, it cannot be denied that Hizballah achieved a 
great deal while influencing the situation in Lebanon.  Hizballah began as a small radical 
splinter group and evolved into not only a locally respected militia but also a legitimate 
political party in Lebanon.  This analysis will attempt to determine if Hizballah’s 
emergence as a social and political power was the result of random historic events or a 
well-planned insurgent movement that achieved success by applying the basic 
fundamentals of insurgency. 
The situation in Lebanon will be analyzed primarily from the early 1980’s 
through the early 1990’s utilizing Dr. McCormick’s counterinsurgency model.  These 
were the formative years for Hizballah; it was during this period that the organization 
went from small splinter groups to force in being to political party.  First will be an 
account of key activities of the parties involved.  Activities will then be analyzed using 
the model and the chapter will finish with conclusions drawn from the analysis.  The 
analysis will be primarily from “the people’s” perspective, bypassing some of the 
                                                 9 The English spelling of Hizballah is varied from author to author, for consistency’s sake the spelling 
used will be “Hizballah” unless it is used as part of a direct quote. 
10 Robert Kaplan, “The Global Security Situation in 2010 and How the Military Must Evolve to Deal 
with it,” speech given at the Marine Memorial Hotel, San Francisco, January 2004. 
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significant International activities being conducted.  For example, the assassination of 
Bashir Gemayel and subsequent collapse of the Israeli plan for the Lebanese government 
had significant international impact, but is not covered in depth.11  Gemayel’s 
assassination was a significant event in the history of Lebanon and had strategic 
implications on Israel’s “big plan.”  While the international strategic implications of the 
assassination were important, their direct effects were removed from the driving forces 
behind the insurgency and therefore are not discussed in detail.  The analysis reveals that 
the success of Hizballah was the result of a properly executed insurgency.   
1. Historical Background 
In 1967 Israel occupied the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights of 
Syria.  While this did not directly affect Lebanon, it did affect opinions throughout the 
Arab world.  The Arab response was to initiate conventional operations against Israel led 
by Egypt from 1967-71, generally referred to as the “war of attrition.”  These operations 
failed to displace the Israelis and shaped an impression of invincibility around the IDF.   
In September of 1970, King Hussein’s Jordanian forces confronted the large 
number of Palestinians occupying western Jordan forcing many of the Palestinians out of 
the country.  Many of the Palestinians fled to Lebanon where the resultant influx of 
Palestinian fighters, along with the earlier creation of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), contributed to increased unrest.  Lebanon became the focal point for 
Palestinian attacks on Israel and subsequent Israeli retaliations.  The main forces in the 
unrest were Muslims backed by the PLO and Iran, fighting Christians backed by the 
Israelis.  Syria initially supported the Christian forces with the intent of preventing any 
one group from dominating Lebanon and thereby threatening Syria’s interests in the 
country.  Syria and Israel both intervened openly and opposingly in the conflict to protect 
their interests, in contrast to previously conducting  
                                                 11 Bashir Gemayel was the President of Lebanon.  The Israelis formed an alliance with his Phalange 
government prior to the Invasion of Lebanon.  The Israeli’s reinforced the control of the Phalange 
government, and thus Gemayel.  In return the Phalange would support the destruction/removal of the PLO 
and sign a Peace Treaty with Israel.  Gemayel was re-elected president in Lebanon’s August Presidential 
elections with the help of Israel.  On 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated prior to any agreements 
being solidified with Israel.  Gemayel’s assassination removed the key figure in Israel’s “big plan” and 
changed Israel’s policy in Lebanon. 
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operations through their respective surrogate forces.  In 1982, the Israelis invaded 
Lebanon and expelled the leadership of the PLO.  It is this invasion that lead directly to 
the formation of Hizballah.12 
The majority of Hizballah’s initial supporters were disillusioned members of 
Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniya (Legions of the Lebanese Resistance) better known 
as AMAL (Amal).  Hizballah supporters objected to Amal’s, and Amal’s then leader 
Nabih Berri’s, moderate policies and presumed willingness to pursue political solutions 
rather than military confrontations to Israel’s invasion.  Hizballah also had ties with 
various other Shiite groups in Lebanon and received ideological leadership from Iran, and 
specifically Ayatollah Khomeini.   
2. Hizballah’s Vision and Mission 
The core of Hizballah’s ideology comes from the teachings of two Muslim 
religious leaders, Iraq’s Baqir al-Sadr and Iran’s Ruhallah Khomeini.  Baqir al-Sadr 
organized Muslim believers to seize power and create an Islamic State to spread to the 
rest of the world.  From Ruhallah Khomeini, the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, the 
organization embraced Iran’s Islamic revolution and adopted the idea that a religious 
jurist (valat-i faqih) should hold ultimate political power derived from sharia (Islamic 
law).  In 1982, while Hizballah was still in its infancy, the supporters were “devout 
Muslims, disillusioned by the established parties’ political ideology and intent on going 
back to basics by creating an entity which would conform to Islamic sharia, Islamic law, 
and the word of the Almighty Allah.”13 
Hizballah’s goals, as stated by the Department of State in Patterns of Global 
Terrorism, 2003, are the liberation of Jerusalem, elimination of Israel, and ultimately the 
establishment of Islamic Rule in Lebanon.  In Hizballah’s manifesto, issued in 1985, they 
declared their political agenda.  Hizballah “vowed never to participate in any of the 
[Lebanese] government’s institutions, so long as the ‘current decaying sectarian system’ 
exists, emphasizing that no measure of reform would be considered sufficient.”14  The 
                                                 12 Sami. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace? (Strategic Studies Institute: 
U.S. Army War College, 2002), 2-3. 
13 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
48. 
14 Ibid., 61. 
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manifesto was worded skillfully to appeal to the greatest number of potential supporters.  
“We do not seek to impose Islam on anyone as we hate those who impose their beliefs 
and regimes on us and we do not want Islam to reign Lebanon by force.”15  The 
organization was appealing to the mass support that self determination could bring.  The 
stated primary objective was to achieve a position where free choice could be had.  
Hizballah felt the people would embrace wisdom of Islam, as an ideology and system, 
and propel the organization to the forefront of the new Islamic state.   
3. Israel’s Vision and Mission16  
Ariel Sharon, then Defense Minister of Israel, developed the “big plan” for the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.  The first aim of the plan was to destroy the PLO’s political 
infrastructure in Lebanon.  The second aim which was a prerequisite for the third was to 
expel Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least undermine Syria’s influence in the country.  
The third aim was to establish a government in Lebanon that would sign a peace treaty 
with Israel, through establishing Christian Maronite leadership in the country.  The 
invasion of Lebanon and destruction of the PLO would have the effect of changing the 
political order not only in Lebanon, but in the Middle East.  The destruction of the PLO 
would break the Palestinians hold in the region and allow permanent Israeli control of the 
West Bank.17 
The initial months after the 1982 invasion did not see much resistance against the 
Israelis in the south, despite the brutal but effective tactics of the Israelis throughout 
Lebanon.  Amal, the main Shiite representative organization at the time, had taken a 
moderate stance and the “southerners even felt a certain affinity with the invaders.”18  
The PLO had been a powerful force in the south and was accused of corruption and 
abuses that alienated the local population.  The PLO abuses initiated open conflict 
between Amal and the PLO in the spring of 1982, prior to the Israeli Invasion.  The 
southern population was happy to see the oppressive PLO removed, even though the 
liberation was brought by Israel.  The southern population accepted the Israeli forces 
                                                 15 Ibid. 
16 This is Israel’s Vision and Mission concerning the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 
17 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 396. 
18 Jaber, 14. 
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because they shared the same desired outcome, the removal of the PLO.  The Israeli’s 
seized the opportunity while Shiite and Palestinian relations were low.  The PLO’s 
removal also allowed refugees to return to their villages.  The assumption was made, 
incorrectly, that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would be gone in a few months.  As the 
occupation wore on, and the IDF established additional population controls, it became 
apparent that the liberating force was becoming an occupation force.   
4. Birth of the Insurgency 
The Israelis began to impose controls on the population in attempts to halt the 
developing insurgency.  The IDF formed militias through an alliance with Lebanese 
Christian Maronites.  The militia forces were called the National Guard and were armed 
and trained by Israel.  This could have been an ideal mechanism to establish a unified and 
legitimate regional security force, but it became apparent that the National Guard’s 
primary role was to protect Israel, not the local population.  The IDF used coercion - 
threatening reprisals on relatives held by the Israelis - to force families to support the 
militias.  Israel, during their occupation, focused on direct action and intimidation to quell 
the developing insurgency.  This was against suggestions of some Israeli officers who 
had recommended fostering a relationship with the Shiites.19  Instead the Israelis 
alienated the predominantly Shiite population, resulting in the insurgent movement.   
Turning a blind eye to Israel’s trespass on their land for the sake of the 
common aim of expelling the PLO was one thing, but becoming their 
surrogates and allowing the Israeli domination of their lives and territory 
was totally unacceptable to the Shiites.20  
The insurgency was initially unorganized; it consisted of small scale protests, 
boycotts of Israeli products, and nuisance attacks against the IDF.  The Lebanese 
National Resistance was formed which was primarily made up of Amal members.  
Hizballah’s existence became evident when pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini started to 
appear in areas with a strong Hizballah influence; indicating an Islamic group influenced 
by Iran, rather than the secular Amal.  Hizballah had not declared itself as an organization 
at this point and continued to fight under the banner of the LNR [Lebanese National 
Resistance].  The organization remained very secretive and “sympathizers who remained 
                                                 19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Jaber, 15-16. 
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within the ranks of Amal were encouraged not to defect ... and were urged to work on 
transforming the Shiite movement from within.”21  Hizballah operated on multiple fronts 
to improve the organization, while recruits were being trained, the leaders were 
developing the organization’s future structure, and clerics preached tirelessly to spread 
the word of the Islamic movement.  The quiet emergence of Hizballah signified a battle 
for Shiite support between the established Amal and the developing Hizballah.   
Israel continued to show no consideration for Shiites affairs.  An incident in 1983 
proved to be the tipping point.  An Israeli convoy arrived at the sight of a significant 
Shiite religious ceremony attended by 50,000 southern Lebanese;22 rather than 
accommodating the Lebanese, the Israeli commander insisted on driving through the 
ceremony.  This offended the Lebanese who reacted furiously to the intrusion.  Israeli 
troops caught in the midst of the riot called for reinforcements and began shooting, 
killing two Shiites.  Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin subsequently issued the first fatwa against 
the Israeli occupiers calling for “civil disobedience”.  Civil disobedience rapidly 
escalated into violence.  Each Lebanese attack was met with Israeli intensification of the 
“harsh campaign of repression against the residents.”23  
The IDF, in an attempt to prevent further infiltration of insurgent fighters into the 
southern region, established a cordon that isolated the southern population, providing 
only one point of entry/exit between the south and the rest of the country.  This was an 
attempt to prevent the infiltration of insurgents into the region, but also served to disrupt 
the economy of the South.  The southern population relied on the sale of fruit and 
vegetables for their livelihood.  The farmers could only watch as their produce spoiled 
while waiting to pass through the single entry/exit point.  This treatment served to further 
emphasize the IDF as an occupation force.  The southern population felt they had traded 
one oppressor – the PLO – for another – the IDF. 
The IDF lack of intelligence on the insurgents, and complete lack of popular 
support to garner that intelligence, led to mass reprisals on the southern population.  The 
                                                 21 Ibid., 54. 
22 The religious ceremony was “the Ashura commemoration of the death of Husayn - the most 
important and impassioned religious ritual in Shi’ism” Glenn Robinson, email to author, 5 November 2004. 
23 Ibid., 19 
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Israelis began to arrest anyone suspected of supporting the insurgents under the “Iron 
Fist” plan of occupation.  The IDF’s situation was rapidly spiraling out of control; rather 
than coercing the population to fear supporting the insurgents, the indiscriminant arrests 
were driving supporters to the insurgency faster than the IDF was able to detain them.  
5. International Influences 
a. Iran and Syria’s Support to Hizballah 
Hizballah’s image as the surrogate for the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 
was reinforced with the 1982 arrival of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa 
Valley.  The Iranians were sent to train and advise Hizballah on how to organize and 
conduct military operations.  The Bekaa Valley was used as the main base for Hizballah, 
which was outside of Amal’s traditional power base.  This allowed Hizballah to postpone 
the conflict with Amal for southern Shiite support.  The valley was also outside of the 
IDF’s area of control.  The safe haven provided Hizballah an area to conduct recruitment, 
organization, and training without interference.  Another benefit was that the valley 
bordered along Syria providing an unobstructed infiltration route for weapons and 
ammunition from the organization’s Iranian support base.   
b. The United Nations Multinational Force 
The United Nations Multinational Force (UNMNF) arrived in Lebanon in 
August 1982.  On 16 September, 1982, Christian militiamen seeking revenge for the 
assassination of President Bashir Gemayel, killed hundreds of unarmed men, women, and 
children in the Shiite Camps of Sabra and Chatila.  This massacre occurred with the 
knowledge and assistance of the IDF, and caused President Reagan to escalate the U.S. 
forces role.  The U.S. portion of the UNMNF’s new mission was “to establish an 
environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their 
responsibilities in the Beirut area.”24  
The fighting in the country had intensified.  Clashes between the Lebanese 
Army and Druze forces escalated around Beirut.25  The U.S. forces provided the 
                                                 24 Department of Defense, “Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist 
Act,” 35, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-
1.html#page40 
25 There were multiple groups vying for power in Lebanon.  The primary participants were: 1) The 
Phalange government which was primarily Christian and maintained power in and around Beirut.  2) Sunni 
Muslims living primarily in urban areas.  3) Shiite Muslims, who were the lower class workers in Lebanon, 
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Lebanese Army supplies in an attempt to reinforce the Lebanese Government.  U.S. 
Marines and Naval warships intervened, shelling Druze and Syrian targets.  The U.S. 
forces had chosen sides in the war in an attempt to maintain the Phalange Government, 
thus violating the UNMNF neutrality.  The U.S. and French barracks were bombed the 
following month.  According to the Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist 
Act, 
The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had 
become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim. After the USMNF 
engaged in direct fire support of the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces], a 
significant portion of the Lebanese populace no longer considered the 
USMNF a neutral force.26  
The Multinational Forces had shifted from members of the International Community to 
active participants on behalf of the COIN Force in the eyes of the Lebanese population.   
6. Hizballah’s Military Branch 
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombings of the MNF barracks which 
killed 241 U.S. and 58 French personnel.  This new group was linked to Hizballah as a 
new radical counterpart to the organization’s more conventional military branch, the 
Islamic Resistance.   Hizballah’s military organization had taken shape, and “the 
substantial salaries and benefits reportedly paid by Hizballah to its fighters encouraged 
rapid growth of the military wing.”27   
Hizballah’s military wing continued to grow, but the continued fighting was 
beginning to affect Hizballah’s popular support.  The southern population was 
accustomed to insurgent fighting and provided active and passive support for the 
movement.  Popular discontent for the insurgents arose out of the casualties, Israeli 
reprisals, and continued deterioration of quality of life.  Waning confidence signified a 
significant crisis for the insurgents attempting to capture Shiite popular support, 
Hizballah and Amal. 
                                                 
living primarily in the rural areas of the south and the Biqa’a Valley, a large Shiite community was later 
established in the southern suburbs of Beirut made up of refugees following the Israeli invasion in the 
south.  The Shiite’s traditionally had no representation in the government. 
26 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport, 40-41. 
27 Judith Harik, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: The Center for 
Lebanese Studies, 1994), 25. 
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7. The Birth of Public and Social Services 
Hizballah and Amal had to demonstrate to the Population that continued support 
would eventually lead to a better life and that the insurgents’ objectives benefited the 
Population.  The insurgent forces needed to adjust operations to accommodate their 
critical popular support base, while continuing the struggle with the IDF.  Hizballah, with 
their substantial Iranian support, was better suited to expand into the new role of service 
provider.  The popular support base had to be maintained simultaneously, because 
military resistance could not and did not stop.  Hizballah initiated their public and social 
services initiatives with the introduction of hospitals and medical care.  “The Islamic 
health [committee] was established in 1984 and Reconstruction Campaign (jihad al-bina’) 
... was created in 1988.”28  The Reconstruction Campaign (RC) became Hizballah’s 
public and social services branch.   
 
Figure 2.   Hizballah Organization Chart (After: Hajjar, 2002, p.8-10; Hamzeh, 1993, p. 
325-328; and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)  
 
                                                 28 Ibid., 26. 
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The RC was dedicated to providing services to the Shiite community that the 
Lebanese Government failed to supply.  As can be seen in Figure 2 above, the RC 
eventually expanded to encompass all aspects of the population’s service needs.  The RC 
became the primary supplier of infrastructure support to the Shiite community in and 
around Beirut.  The Lebanese Government historically distributed services based on 
community allegiance.  This meant that Maronite Christian communities received the 
majority of the government services and Shiite communities, who had less influential 
government representation, received very little.  Each group - Druze, Christian, and Shiite 
- was forced to establish service organizations to cater to their respective support bases to 
make up for government short comings.  Hizballah’s initial efforts were to provide the 
basic essentials of life: food, water, shelter, and medical assistance.  The RC operations 
expanded to include infrastructure development, agricultural reform, financial support, 
and other services normally provided by the government.  Hizballah’s greatest asset for 
developing popular support became its “steady, patient, reliable work in a country with a 
government of big talk and little action.”29  Amal’s support continued to be strong in the 
South, but Amal’s service organization was relatively small when compared to 
Hizballah’s and other organizations’.  The Iranian support for Hizballah enabled the RC 
to provide a broader amount of social services and in larger quantities, which slowly 
undermined Amal’s support base.  Amal and Hizballah had different visions of how to 
achieve change in Lebanon which distinguished the two organizations.  Amal was a 
reform party seeking to maximize Shiite benefits within the existing system.  Hizballah 
was a revolutionary party seeking to change the system entirely, at least early on. 
B. APPLICATION OF MCCORMICK’S MODEL 
1. The Players 
a. The Insurgent Force 
The focus in this case study is primarily Hizballah (Party of God), but also 
includes their interaction with other insurgent forces in the area with similar goals.  In 
southern Lebanon the main “rival” insurgent group competing for popular support 
(mainly from within the Shiite community) and legitimacy was Amal.  Amal was seeking 
                                                 29 Harik, Public and Social Services, 53. 
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political secularization and improvement of the political system.  Hizballah was seeking 
the establishment of Islamic authority in Lebanon through military conflict.   
b. The COIN Force 
The IDF is the primary COIN force in this case study.  Israel’s efforts 
were assisted by their surrogates consisting of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the 
National Guard they created (primarily Christian forces).  The IDF, as opposed to the 
Lebanese Army, is the primary COIN force because the Israelis were the force that 
“controlled” southern Lebanon.  While the Shiite’s desired representation in the Lebanese 
government, the foremost threat for the insurgents was the presence of Israeli forces in 
Southern Lebanon.  Only after the removal of the IDF could Hizballah attempt to 
influence Lebanese politics.  This makes the IDF and their surrogates the primary targets 
of the insurgent force and subsequently the primary COIN force. 
c. The Population 
The population is made up of the residents of Lebanon.  The primary focus 
is on the residents of Southern Lebanon.  The population is made up of 
individuals/groups/communities whose popular opinion can influence the insurgency; this 
would include Lebanese residents outside the embattled southern region, as well as the 
Israeli population’s opinion of the IDF operations.  
d. The International Community 
The primary participants of the International Community were Iran, Syria, 
and the UNMNF (primarily the U.S. and French Forces).   
2. Strategic Analysis 
The CF and IF both started by focusing on direct action, with similar results.  The 
IDF received initial popular support by removing the PLO, but this initial elation waned 
when it became apparent the IDF was becoming an occupation force that placed Israel’s 
desires over the “liberated” population.  The “Iron Fist” policy of heavy handed control 
measures further alienated the Population.  The IF went through the same cycle as the 
IDF.  Initially the insurgents’ direct action gained them popular support by demonstrating 
that someone was fighting for the population’s interests and standing up to the current 
oppressive occupiers.  The role of oppressor had shifted from the PLO to the IDF, and the 
role of liberator had shifted from the IDF to the insurgents.  The insurgents also began to 
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lose popular support – like the IDF had – mainly due to the lack of improvements in the 
population’s quality of life.  Hizballah’s enforcement of strict Islamic law also revived 
past feelings of repression.    
a. Strategy 1 - Struggle for Support of the Population 
Israel failed to focus on the Population as a center of gravity for the 
counterinsurgency.  The IDF’s solution to counter deteriorating popular support was to 
increase assaults (Strategy 3) and population controls designed to separate the insurgents 
from the Population (Strategy 2).  Research does not indicate the implementation of any 
IDF programs to gain popular support (Strategy 1); instead the focus was “a war to 
remove once and for all the threat hanging over the Galilee.”30  Israel did not want to 
establish a unified security zone; they wanted to remove any threat to Galilee by 
expanding their border.  The southern population of Lebanon was viewed as a target, 
never a potential asset, and Israel’s plan never included attempts to win the Population’s 
support (Strategy 1).  If the Israelis had adopted combined control over the Population 
(Lebanese & Israeli) and succeeded in establishing an alliance with the Shiites, they 
could have integrated the southern population as valuable allies to secure the border.   
The IDF was caught in a deadly yet predictable spiral; the more they 
alienated the Population, the less intelligence they could gather.  Diminishing intelligence 
on the insurgents reduced the availability of discriminate targets for operations.  The IDF 
transitioned to mass reprisals causing further alienation of the Population.  Indiscriminant 
attacks affected both the insurgent and the Population, creating greater sympathy for the 
insurgent movement.  The effects of assaults on discriminate targets are limited to the 
insurgent.   
The IDF also used coercion in the early stages of the occupation.  
Coercion has been demonstrated to be effective in gaining popular support only under 
specific conditions.  The use of coercion is effective in getting someone to do something 
they do not want to, but the end result needs to demonstrate some benefit for the coerced 
group to achieve a lasting positive effect.  For example, U.S. Marines in Nicaragua in the 
1920’s used coercion to convince local Moskito supporters to attack a rebel leader.  The 
Moskito’s feared annihilation by the rebel force, but when the rebel leader’s camp was                                                  30 Shlaim, 405. 
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captured the U.S. Marines had demonstrated to the Moskito’s that they could succeed and 
subsequently won the Moskito’s loyalty.  The IDF used coercion on the Lebanese 
population without providing any positive incentives.  The Lebanese had to provide 
information to prevent reprisals on relatives held by the IDF (coercion), but the resulting 
information did not contribute in any way to an improved life for the Lebanese.  To use 
the “carrot and stick” analogy, the IDF applied the “stick”, but supplied no “carrot” to 
gain any lasting conformance.  
The Insurgents were also faced with declining popular support.  Hizballah 
identified the critical necessity for popular support and directed its efforts to counteract 
the loss at the target audience – the Population.  Unlike the IDF application of Strategies 
2 & 3 which was directed primarily at the insurgent movement, Hizballah focused on the 
Population through the efforts of the RC.  Hizballah was able to counteract the 
deteriorating popular support by demonstrating the organization’s dedication to the 
population’s quality of life.  The resultant correlation was that support for the insurgent 
movement would lead to a better life.  Thus, Hizballah’s attacks on the COIN Force (the 
source of IF’s deteriorating popular support) had to continue, but the “carrot” given to the 
Population was that Hizballah’s continued success (which required popular support) was 
tied to public and social services.   
Hizballah also capitalized on Amal’s mistakes to maximize popular 
support within the Shiite community.  This was highlighted by an incident in 1993 when,  
The Council of the South, a government organization close to Amal, 
apparently distributed aid along party lines, causing considerable 
discontent in the area.  Hizballah made the most of the situation by 
furnishing assistance to villages bypassed by the Council of the South.31 
Hizballah’s capitalization on Amal’s preferential distribution would continue to 
undermine Amal’s support base and prove to have lasting effects evident in Hizballah’s 
success in the 1992 political elections.   
                                                 31 Judith Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications for Popular Support for 
Lebanon’s Hizballah,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 40, No. 1, (1996): 41-67 
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Hizballah distributed public and social services without any evident 
concern for “free-riding”32.  The RC could have distributed services preferentially thus 
limiting “free-riding”, but learned from Amal’s mistake and instead, as Harik puts it, 
“claim[ed] moral highground.”33  Hizballah relied on their actions being sufficient to win 
popular support, without the need for coercive techniques.  This lack of concern over 
“free-riding” can also be explained by the complete lack of popular support to the IDF, 
meaning at least passive support to the insurgent movement was already secured. 
b. Strategy 2 - Separation of the Opponent and the Population 
Israel’s consistently used force to separate the Population from the IF, 
rather than by co-opting the Population.  The IDF continued to attempt to force the 
population to Israel’s will rather than convince them of the legitimacy of their cause.  
Israel’s tactics produced resentment not only in the Population, but even within the IDF.  
The cordon around southern Lebanon was the IDF’s attempt to halt the influx of 
insurgents from the north, thus separating the insurgents from their popular support base.  
In theory, this would prevent the infiltration of insurgents into the region, diminishing the 
number of insurgents conducting attacks, and eventually lead to a more stable life in the 
south.  Instead, the Israeli cordon further drove a wedge between the occupation force 
and the local population.  The mass application of Strategy 2 through force, at the 
expense of Strategy 1 (gaining popular support), caused further alienation of the 
Population and reinforced the perception of the IDF as oppressors.  It also drove the 
Population to the insurgents, increasing recruitment and support. 
Hizballah’s efforts to separate the CF from the Population were primarily 
through information/influence operations and perception management.  The organization 
was not strong enough to physically deny the interaction between the IDF and the 
Population, but Hizballah used propaganda to prevent the IDF from gaining any popular 
support.  Hizballah used the media under their Enforcement, Recruitment, and 
Propaganda branch (see Figure 2 above) to distribute the group’s ideology.  The Research 
                                                 
32 Free-riding is the act of receiving the rewards of individual or group collective action without 
taking the risk of providing active or passive support.  In the struggle for popular support, groups (Insurgent 
or COIN forces) will normally attempt to prevent free-riding.  Groups will want to capitalize on their 
efforts by maximizing popular support from their actions through limiting the population’s free-riding 
ability.  This forces the population to choose sides in order to receive the desired benefits.   
33 Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” 51. 
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and Propaganda division established a television station, two radio stations, and two 
publications to ensure the broadest dissemination of Hizballah’s message.  Propaganda 
focused on the mistakes of the IDF and “assert[ed] that the soldiers were occupiers and 
not their saviours.”34   
Hizballah also embraced the rally cry of a cause larger than national 
liberation.  Hizballah portrayed it as a struggle between Islam and Zionist oppression.  
This was a combination of denying support to the Zionist oppressors (Strategies 2) and 
increasing popular support for Hizballah (Strategy 1).  Israel was forced to portray the 
fight as between Israel and Lebanon to prevent escalation into broader Arab State 
involvement.  As Martin Kramer said, “this [Hizballah’s] grandiose vision served the 
deepest needs of the most alienated of Lebanon’s Shi’ites.”35 
c. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against the Opponent 
The use of Strategy 3 by both the IF and CF alienated the Population and 
the International Community, but the critical difference is how the forces adapted their 
military operations in response to this.  Neither side felt they could stop direct attacks 
without detrimental effects on their respective military objectives.  The IDF responded to 
alienating the Population and International Community by increasing its attacks and 
repressive control measures.  Hizballah identified the need to continue direct attacks 
(both for recruitment and to counter the IDF), but it used a combination of specific 
targets, religious approval, and provided services to maintain the Population’s support.  
Hizballah introduced suicide attacks to demonstrate their dedication to the defeat of 
Israel.  The suicide attack also gave Hizballah the ability to direct the assault at a specific 
target and time, thus limiting collateral damage.  Approval of religious leaders was also 
obtained to justify and legitimize targets.  The key difference between Israel and 
Hizballah’s use of direct action was the consideration given to the effects.  The IDF either 
failed to consider effects on the Population and International Community or considered 
the effects inconsequential; while Hizballah changed its military strategy to ensure 
                                                 34 Jaber, 50. 
35 Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, ed., Fundamentalisms and the State: remaking polities, militance, 
and economies (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) 546. 
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continued support from the Population, while achieving the desired effects on the 
International Community (withdrawal of the MNF).  
d. Strategy 4 - Separation of the Opponent and the International 
Community 
The UNMNF was the International Community’s (more specifically 
western countries) attempt to get involved in Lebanon, initially as peacekeepers and later 
on the side of the CF.  Hizballah proved capable of disrupting the International 
Community’s involvement.  The UNMNF chose sides in the conflict, violating their 
neutrality and legitimizing the UNMNF as targets for Hizballah.  The subsequent attacks 
increased the MNF’s price of involvement to an unacceptable level.  Israel and the MNF 
attempted Strategy 4, by attacking/capturing Syrian Forces and Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard members.  The physical costs for Iran and Syria were never raised to a level that 
outweighed the importance of involvement.  The diplomatic costs were never raised 
enough to coerce Iran or Syria into denying support.  The attacks on the MNF barracks 
raised the U.S. and French costs of involvement to unacceptable levels.  Thus Hizballah 
was able to achieve success in Strategy 4, while Israel did not. 
e. Strategy 5 - Involving the International Community 
The International Community had a significant effect in Lebanon during 
both the war with Israel and the Civil War.  Iran and Syria had the most direct 
involvement in the area, but international opinion affected both insurgent and COIN 
operations.  Iran’s Islamic revolution was instrumental in shaping Hizballah’s ideology; 
the Iranian Revolution served as an example and inspiration for Hizballah’s own 
insurgent movement.  Iranian financial and resource support also boosted Hizballah’s 
flexibility and allowed the organization to operate on a larger scale.  Iranian training, 
combined with material and financial support, helped Hizballah transition from a weak 
insurgent group to a “force in being.”  The RC also thrived with the help of Iranian 
financial and resource support, supplying technical assistance, resources, and financial 
backing to execute the RC’s broad range of public and social services.  It is possible that 
Hizballah may have been just as capable of accomplishing this without Iran’s support, the 
movement was strong and based in popular perceptions and might have risen above the 
resource constraints without international support.  There is no data linking Hizballah’s 
strength to the amount of foreign aid it was receiving, but it is likely that the 
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organization’s expansion would not have been as rapid without foreign (Iranian and/or 
other organization) support.  Syria’s support was focused on the more secular Amal, but 
Syria’s lack of border control benefited Hizballah by allowing materials (weapons, 
ammunition, tractors...) into the country.   
Iranian support to Hizballah was arguably more influential in the battle for 
Lebanese popular support, than it was to military operations.  Hizballah used Iran’s 
support to make the RC a critical service provider within the country.  The RC became so 
important to the population that even if the Lebanese Government had wanted to make a 
move against the organization, the government would have had to do so against Lebanese 
popular opinion.  As Lebanese and Hizballah expert Judith Harik noted, “It would be 
particularly difficult for the government to move against them [the RC] should it desire to 
undercut a major source of Hizballah’s popularity.”36  The RC’s essential work in the 
region won Hizballah popular support at the local level and propelled the organization to 
significant prominence in the Lebanese Political system.   
In the local struggle for Shiite support, Harik pointed to the direct 
correlation between the ability of the organization (Hizballah or Amal) to provide social 
services and the ability to mobilize the large Shiite population.  Hizballah, with Iran’s 
support, was more effective in providing these services, gaining Hizballah critical Shiite 
and Lebanese popular support.  The RC’s support transcended the Shiite community.  
Hizballah’s capabilities and policy of providing support to anyone in need gained them 
support throughout Lebanon.  This can best be seen in an interview by Harik with a 
Lebanese Christian about an incident prior to the 1992 elections. 
The candidate, who lost to one of Hizballah’s contestants in the 1992 
parliamentary elections, had solicited the vote of a lifelong acquaintance, a 
Christian from Bishwat in the Biqa’a.  In reply, the man from Bishwat had 
asked “Where were you when we needed emergency snow removal and 
fuel?  In this village, everyone is going to vote for Hizballah.37 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE STRATEGIES 
The application of McCormick’s model to the war in Lebanon clearly 
demonstrates that Hizballah executed a well planned insurgency following the                                                  36 Harik, Public and Social Services, 53. 
37 Harik, “Between Islam and the System”, 55. 
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fundamentals of the model.  Simultaneously the analysis shows that Israel did not follow 
the fundamentals of counterinsurgency and subsequently failed.  The model provides 
insight into both sides’ actions and the effects those actions had on the ultimate outcome 
of the war.  There is a direct correlation between the application (or lack thereof) of the 
model’s Strategies and Principle to success or failure of the effort.   
Hizballah inherently understood the Principle behind McCormick’s 
counterinsurgency model and used the model’s strategies effectively, though Hizballah 
had not received formal training in insurgent strategy38.  The development of Hizballah’s 
campaign plan revolved around considerations for the Population, and the organization 
ensured this was present throughout the insurgency’s planning process.  While the IDF 
focused on military objectives and might, Hizballah focused on the Population as its 
primary consideration, maintaining the moral and religious “high ground”.  Both the CF 
and IF understood the necessity of direct action on the opponent, but Hizballah followed 
Strategy 3 within the limits it could positively effect popular and international perception.   
The IDF approached the occupation with a conventional military focus; the 
primary consideration was the military (as opposed to political) defeat of the opponent.  
If the IDF had approached the conflict as an insurgency, understanding that popular and 
international perceptions were critical, they may have achieved Israel’s objective of a 
secure northern boarder.  The Israeli failure to establish a unified security force, in 
conjunction with the southern Lebanese population instead of despite them, prevented the 
Israelis from developing a stable security zone.  The IDF failed to establish or maintain 
its connection with either the Population or the International Community (failure of 
Strategies 1 & 5).  Additionally, the IDF failed to disrupt Hizballah’s connection with 
either the Population or the International Community (failure of Strategies 2 & 4).  The 
Israelis’ implemented Strategy 3 successfully, but failed to consider the effects of their 
direct actions.  So even if the operations were conducted flawlessly from a military 
perspective, the overarching strategy was flawed throughout.   
Hizballah capitalized on the IDF mistakes and unified the southern population 
against the Israelis.  Hizballah was able to exploit the underlying disillusionment of the 
                                                 38 Hizballah did receive trainers from Iran, but research indicates this was primarily military and 
ideological training, not necessarily strategic planning. 
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Population and unify Lebanon through an application of Strategies 1 thru 3.  Throughout 
the insurgency Hizballah used all five strategies, but emphasized Strategy 1 (popular 
support) as the main effort and the other strategies as supporting efforts.  The RC’s 
contributions to Hizballah’s insurgency were vital in reinforcing popular support and 
instrumental in the success of the overall insurgency.  Iran’s support (Strategy 5) proved 
critical to Hizballah’s success.  Military training and more importantly financial and 
resource support allowed Hizballah to transition from a “force in development” to a 
“force in being”.  Hizballah also successfully executed Strategy 4, causing the withdrawal 
of the MNF and the alienation of the IDF and Christian Militias.   
The Lebanese population needed a champion for their cause, and Hizballah filled 
that role.  Hizballah members made themselves seen as national liberation fighters.  
According to Professor Baylouny “This is overwhelming -- even the [Lebanese] 
Christians, who in general are quite racist against anything Muslim, are proud of 
Hizballah having kicked out Israel.”39  Hizballah was able to unify the population, not 
just the Shiites, under a cause that was seen to benefit all of Lebanon.  While it may have 
been an un-winnable situation for the IDF no mater what actions were taken40, the model 
clearly indicates that the IDF were doomed to failure by not considering the model’s 
fundamentals. 
The situation in Lebanon may be somewhat unique (as are all insurgencies), but 
the fundamentals of McCormick’s insurgency/counterinsurgency model applied to 
Lebanon aptly explain the model.  Dr. McCormick’s Model is just as applicable in the 
Middle East as it is in Latin America, because it addresses the underlying nature and 
causes of an insurgency rather than specific considerations of any particular insurgency.  
Just as the factors in any country are not exactly alike, neither is the methodology behind 
an insurgency.  The specific conditions of an insurgency dictate the application of the 
                                                 39 Anne Marie Baylouny, “RE: Hizballah / Lebanon,” Email to author, 1 June 2004 
40 The point has been made that the IDF could not have gained popular support based on the 
ethnic/religious prejudices of the region.  Basically no Muslim would support Israel.  The counter to this 
point is in Hizballah’s ability to unify portions of the population to their cause despite traditional divides.  
This can be seen in the quote above where the Christian voted for Hizballah’s candidate because Hizballah 
provided support when they needed it.  This indicates that traditional preferences can be surpassed by 
current actions.  Support is gained by the side that provides the best prospects for the future.  People require 
sustenance and security to survive; if these cannot be obtained through traditional allegiances they will 
accept them from whoever can fulfill the requirement.   
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model’s strategies.  Forces must remain flexible, actively seeking feedback from their 
target audience and adjusting their operations as necessary.  The fundamentals behind the 
model remain applicable to any insurgency/counterinsurgency campaign.  The utility of 
the model is that it identifies strategies that succeeded or failed, which can then be used 
to provide insight into future conflicts.   
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IV. GLOBAL INSURGENCY 
[T]he threat America faces from bin Laden is not the episodic terrorist 
campaign typical of those perpetrated by traditional terrorist groups.  It is 
rather a worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally guided 
Islamist insurgency... 
     Anonymous41 
 
A.  WHAT IS THE GLOBAL INSURGENCY? 
An intra-state insurgent’s objective is to remove a government or occupying force 
and establish a new political order.  The global insurgent’s objective is to remove western 
influence from the Muslim world and establish an Islamic caliphate.42  Intra-state 
insurgents use remote areas as safe havens to plan, train, and organize; in the global 
insurgency the terrorists use weak states or contested/uncontrolled areas as their safe 
havens.  An intra-state insurgency is not defeated by defending the cities, in the global 
war on terrorism the U.S. “cannot rely solely or even primarily on a defensive 
strategy.”43  Each region/municipality must work, either with or without national 
government support, to defeat the intra-state insurgent.  In the global insurgency each 
country must work, either with or without international support, to defeat the global 
insurgent.   
The conflict between “terrorists of global reach”44 and the U.S and its allies has 
been described in many ways: the U.S. Government refers to it as the “War on 
Terrorism,”45 Samuel P. Huntington calls it a “Clash of Civilizations,”46 and the 9/11 
Commission said the U.S. was caught in a “Clash within a Civilization.”47  The objective 
                                                 41 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002, xvii. 
42 See bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 Fatwa’s. 
43 Douglas Feith, U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism, April 14, 2004. From a speech given to the 
Political Union University of Chicago.  Chicago, IL 
44 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1. Terrorism is an inherently 
illegitimate cause. 
45 Bush, 2. 
46 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster). 
47 United States Government, the 9/11 Report: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States St. Martin’s Paperbacks edition / August 2004 (New York: St. Martin’s Press) 518.  This 
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of this chapter is not to add another to the list of names or to prove that this is a global 
insurgency.  The purpose is to bypass the debate over defining the conflict as a global 
insurgency48 and determine the utility of addressing the conflict as a global insurgency.  
The main assumption is that the dynamics of the global insurgency parallel an intra-state 
insurgency.  Based on this assumption, the tools utilized to analyze an intra-state 
insurgency equally apply to the concept of a global insurgency.  Dr. McCormick’s 
counterinsurgency model will be used to analyze the current strategies of the opposing 
forces in the conflict to determine if the U.S. and its allies are applying the basic 
fundamentals required to defeat a global insurgent.   
On September 11, 2001 nineteen hijackers conducted a synchronized attack on the 
United States.  This attack served as a message from al Qaeda that the war it had declared 
in 199649 was being brought to U.S. soil.  Like the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the 
United States was being pulled into a war that was already ongoing.  Unlike the attacks 
bringing the U.S. into World War II, the United States is not coming to the aid of its 
allies, but is entering the conflict to defend its global interests as the lone superpower.   
In 2001, President Bush declared that the United States was at war with terrorism.  
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) states, “The enemy is not 
one person.  It is not a single political regime.  Certainly it is not a religion.  The enemy is 
terrorism.”50  While the NSCT states the enemy is simply terrorism, the 9/11 report 
began to define who and what terrorism is.  The report stated: 
 
                                                 
refers to an “insurgency within Islam” indicating a war in which the U.S. is only a member of the 
International Community. 
48 See the following arguments for defining the conflict as a global insurgency: Michael Vlahos, 
Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam, (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University, Joint Warfare Analysis 
Department, 2002).  Daniel Byman, “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” The National Interest, Summer 2003, 
75-84.  Grant Highland, New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency Within Islam and the Nature 
of the War on Terror, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, FEB 2003).  Michael Kometer, The New 
Terrorism: The Nature of the War on Terrorism, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 2002).  This list 
is meant to provide examples and is not all inclusive. 
49 In his August 23, 1996 fatwah “The Declaration of War” Usamah bin Muhammad bin Laden 
declared war “against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places [the Arabian Peninsula].”  
Translated by Muhammad A. S. Al-Mass’ari.   
50 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 1. 
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Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that 
struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic 
world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups 
and violence across the globe.51 
The enemy in the Global Insurgency thus becomes the al Qaeda Network (AQN) and the 
broader radical Islamic ideological movement they espouse.   
1. Birth of the Insurgency 
The United States had been combating terrorism for years, but it was not until the 
events of 11 September 2001 that all elements of the government were mobilized in a 
“war on terrorism.”  On the other hand, the insurgent, specifically al Qaeda, had already 
been planning and fighting the war against the United States for over a decade.  In an 
interview in 1998 bin Laden said:  
It has been nine years since we have been struggling against the United 
States ... In these nine years, we have inflicted considerable damage on the 
United States in different places and will continue to do the same in the 
future.52 
This indicates that in 1989, the same year as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, al 
Qaeda had shifted its focus to the United States.   
Bin Laden formed his ideological foundation during his fighting in Afghanistan.  
He framed the conflict as one of Islam vs. Kufr (non-believer in Islam), this allowed him 
the flexibility to establish a support base that transcended international borders and was 
based in religious beliefs.  “Unlike many nationalist movements in Algeria, Egypt, 
Palestine, or even Saudi Arabia, where jihad was launched for the good of the homeland, 
this particular jihad was for Allah and geopolitics.”53  The AQN, just as Hizballah had 
done in Lebanon, embraces the rally cry of a cause larger than national liberation.  
Kramer’s comment on Hizballah, “this grandiose vision served the deepest needs of the 
most alienated,”54 is also applicable to al Qaeda and the broader Islamist movement.  The 
battle against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan became a struggle against evil and                                                  51 The 9/11 Report, 519. 
52 Abu Shiraz, “May 1998 Interview with Bin Ladin Reported,” Pakistan, 10, 20 February 1999.  
(Original article published in Urdu.  Article translated by and available through the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service). 
53 Mamoun Fandy, 191. 
54 Marty and Appleby, 546. 
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atheism, and the Mujahideen became its “Muslim warriors.”  “For him [bin Laden] the 
language and symbols of ideology take precedence over the political or economic 
realities.”55 
Following the conclusion of the Afghanistan war, the Arab fighters that answered 
the call to jihad expected to be recognized as heroes of Islam.  As noted Saudi historian 
Mamoun Fandy stated, instead “the public did not share this euphoria with the Islamist 
fighters.”  He goes on to say that “this, in addition to shellshock and other war-related 
factors, turned the men into social misfits who were looking for another war to fight.”  
Bin Laden and al Qaeda were prepared to fill this void with the fight against the 
“apostate” Saudi Regime and their American supporters.  As bin Laden put it: 
The [Saudi] regime is fully responsible for what had been incurred by the 
country and the nation; however the occupying American enemy is the 
principle and the main cause of the situation.  Therefore efforts should be 
concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy...56 
Bin Laden failed to change the Saudi regime from within and used his ideological 
leadership and contacts developed during the Afghan war to unite the disaffected Arab 
fighters in a new struggle for Islam.  The struggle expanded from removal of the apostate 
Saudi regime, to include removal of western influence on the Arabian Peninsula, and 
continued to expand to the removal of western influence from all Muslim countries. 
2. Al Qaeda’s Vision and Mission 
“[Al Qaeda’s] current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the 
world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems 
‘non-Islamic’ and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims [and their influence] from 
Muslim countries—particularly Saudi Arabia.”57  Al Qaeda’s main opponents are the 
United States and Israel; but Al Qaeda has not limited its “declarations of war” to the 
United States and Israel exclusively.  In July 2004 an Islamist website posted a message 
saying “we declare a ‘bloody war’ on you [European states].”58  This was posted as a 
                                                 55 Mamoun Fandy, 191.  
56 Usamah bin Laden, “Declaration of War.” 
57 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2003, Released 29 April 2004.  Available 
from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31711.htm; Internet; Accessed 21 October 2004. 
58 “Al-Qaeda declares war on Europe as deadline passes,” Taipei Times, 30 July 2004; available from 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/07/30/2003180983/print; Internet; accessed 21 
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message to the European states for failing to adhere to bin Laden’s ultimatum to 
withdraw troops from Muslim countries.  Authenticity of the statement has not been 
verified,59 but if true, it indicates al Qaeda’s desire to continue to expand the war beyond 
its initially stated objectives to include any and every entity deemed to oppose Islam. 
The next step (following the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan) toward 
establishing a pan-Islamic Caliphate is to remove the U.S./western influence throughout 
the Muslim community.  Usamah bin Laden has said:  
We are certain - with the grace of Allah - that we shall prevail over the 
Jews and over those fighting with them. Today however, our battle against 
the Americans is far greater than our battle was against the Russians. 
Americans have committed unprecedented stupidity. They have attacked 
Islam and its most significant sacrosanct symbols...  We anticipate a black 
future for America. Instead of remaining United States, it shall end up 
separated states and shall have to carry the bodies of its sons back to 
America.60  
Bin Laden bases his jihad on the history of Islam, which gives it broad appeal to 
the Umma (community of the Muslim faithful).  As the Mongols and Crusaders were 
defeated by Muslims in the 13th Century, bin Laden views himself as fighting the modern 
day battles against the enemies of Islam.  The defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan 
represents the defeat of the modern day Mongols, while the defeat of the “Zionist-
Crusader alliance”61 will represent the completion of the modern day Islamic cycle of 
history.  “Bin Laden ... believes that he and his followers brought down the evil empire of 
communism in Afghanistan,”62 where, in bin Laden’s words, “by the Grace of Allah-the 
largest infidel military force of the world was destroyed.”63   
                                                 
October 2004. 
59 The ultimatum has been authenticated by the U.S. CIA, but not the follow-up declaration of a 
bloody war. 
60 John Miller, “Interview Osama Bin Laden, May 1998,” Frontline; available from 
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61 Usamah bin Laden, “Declaration of War” 
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In the 1996 “Declaration of War” bin Laden quotes the Prophet Mohammad who 
said: “around twelve thousand will emerge from Aden/Abian helping-the cause of-Allah 
and his messenger, they are the best, in the time, between me and them.”64  Bin Laden 
views his followers as the core of these 12,000 defenders of Islam.  This belief was 
exemplified by bin Laden’s offer to Saudi Arabia to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
following their 1990 invasion65 and thus “replacing the crusaders forces [U.S. military] 
by an Islamic force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people.”66  
The rejection of this offer served to heighten bin Laden’s antipathy for the Saudi 
government and reinforced bin Laden’s perception that the Saudi regime had “betrayed 
the Ummah and joined the Kufr ... one of the ten ‘voiders’ of Islam.”67  Usamah bin 
Laden uses the betrayal of the Saudi Regime to question the legitimacy of that 
government and reinforce the legitimacy, in the eyes of the Ummah, of Al Qaeda’s cause.  
The AQN are the defenders of Islam and it is their duty to remove the crusaders, and the 
apostate regimes that support them, from Muslim countries worldwide. 
3. United States’ Vision and Mission 
To be successful in the war on terrorism, the United States must ensure that 
neither the AQN nor the broader radical ideological movement within Islam achieve their 
strategic objectives.  The goal of the broader radical ideological movement is to return 
Islam to its global leadership role by establishing a regional and/or global caliphate.  The 
goal of the AQN is to remove the Saudi Regime and its western supporters (specifically 
the U.S.) from Muslim countries in support of the broader ideological movement. 
The 9/11 Commission report divides the conflict into two critical branches: the 
war of ideas and combating the AQN.  The two branches must be addressed 
simultaneously and will often overlap.  A comprehensive and overarching strategic plan 
must be established to ensure a continuous and seamless approach is followed.  One 
                                                 64 Ibid. 
65 Fandy, 183.  Additional background for this conclusion was obtained from an interview on the 
Discovery Times Channel of a, then, Saudi Intelligence Official.  The official stated (paraphrased) that 
Usamah bin Laden had offered to fight Iraq so the Saudi’s would not have to rely on the infidel army of the 
United States for defense (Transcript of the program is unavailable).  Bin Laden felt that if he and his 
Muslim fighters fought Iraq there would then be no need for the U.S. to maintain a presence in Saudi 
Arabia. 
66 Usamah bin Laden, “Declaration of War.” 
67 Ibid. 
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branch cannot be addressed without considering the implications on the other; the 
strategy for each can - and must - be mutually supportive.  U.S. Joint Staff doctrine for 
Psychological Operations states that “all military actions should be thoroughly evaluated 
for their psychological implications.”68  Similarly all military actions must be thoroughly 
evaluated for their psychological and political implications on the war of ideas.  
Conversely, all diplomatic actions in the war of ideas must be thoroughly evaluated for 
their psychological and political implications on combating the AQN.  Will military 
operations in country B affect the progress of diplomatic coordination in the war of ideas?  
Will diplomatic agreements with country A affect the prosecution of military operations 
against the AQN?  These are critical questions that must be asked throughout the conduct 
of countering the global insurgency.  The planning and actions of all elements of the U.S. 
Government, as well as its allies, must be unified and cohesive to ensure a comprehensive 
plan is executed.  While this study primarily focuses on combating the AQN, the 
conclusions also provide insights into the broader war of ideas. 
The U.S. NSCT states that: 
The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the 
United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around 
the world and ultimately, to create an international environment 
inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.69 
The strategy goes on to say that this will be accomplished by simultaneously acting on 
four fronts; commonly referred to as the “four D’s”: Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and 
Defend.   
a. Defeat 
The NSCT outlines how the United States will defeat terrorists of global 
reach by initially attacking their established infrastructure: “sanctuaries; leadership; 
command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”70  The 
disruption this causes will force the terrorists to disperse and decentralize removing their 
                                                 68 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53”, 10 July 1996, 
I-3. 
69 George W. Bush, 11. 
70 Ibid. 
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global influence.  Once the “global reach” capability is restricted, the terrorist are pushed 
back below the spectrum of global threat to localized threats.  The terrorists will then be  
attacked in conjunction with regional partners and allies, providing a cumulative 
reduction of the terrorist’s threat capabilities, and returning terrorism to the “criminal 
domain.”71 
b. Deny 
The main focus of deny is on terrorist “sponsorship, support, and 
sanctuary.”72  The United States, in coordination with UN Security Council resolutions 
and 12 UN conventions and protocols, will attempt to prevent the terrorists from 
recruiting, refitting, and reorganizing.  Separating terrorists from their sponsors and 
support will deny availability of critical resources needed to plan, train for, and conduct 
operations.  Denying sanctuary will prevent the terrorists from having the opportunity to 
reorganize and reestablish a global threat.  A terrorist that is constantly on the move to 
survive does not have time to plan or conduct major operations.   
c. Diminish 
This front is designed to diminish the “underlying conditions that terrorists 
seek to exploit.”73   The United States in conjunction with the international community 
will focus resources and efforts on at risk regions to prevent the (re)emergence of 
terrorists.  Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) Douglas Feith’s April 2004 
speech further expanded on this area of emphasis.  Combining the NSCT and USD(P) 
Feith’s speech broadens diminish to include “countering ideological support for 
terrorism... which is sometimes referred to as the battle of ideas.”  This addition makes 
diminish a critical aspect in the war on terrorism.  As Mr. Feith says in his speech, “The 
war on terrorism will never end if all we do is disrupt and attack terrorist networks.”  
Addressing the underlying conditions not only refers to economic and political 
conditions, but more importantly the ideological conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.  
This is an emphasis that was not readily apparent in the NSCT alone.  
  
                                                 71 Ibid., 13. 
72 Ibid., 11. 
73 Ibid., 12. 
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d. Defend 
Defend is the specific act of protecting the United States, its citizens, and 
its national interests at home and abroad.  This is to be done by both proactively 
establishing homeland defenses and extending defense to identify and neutralize the 
threat as early as possible. 
B. APPLICATION OF MCCORMICK’S MODEL 
1. The Players 
a. The Insurgent Force - The Al Qaeda Network 
The focus in this case study is the AQN.  The war on terrorism has grown 
from a war with al Qaeda to include the organizations that directly or indirectly support al 
Qaeda’s objectives.  These supporting terrorist organizations can be motivated by the 
Islamist ideology or their own particular beliefs.  The critical factor is if they are willing 
to provide active or passive support to the AQN in the achievement of al Qaeda’s 
strategic objectives, whether separate or parallel to their own strategic objectives.  Thus 
any organization becomes part of the AQN if they are willing to support the battle against 
western influence as defined by Usamah bin Laden.   
b. The Counterinsurgent Force - The Coalition 
The United States and its coalition partners are the primary COIN force.  
This is based as much on the insurgent declaring the U.S. as the primary enemy, as on the 
U.S. lead in the war on terrorism.  Once again the insurgent is defining its opponent.   
Far from being alone in the conflict, the United States has many allies in 
the war on terrorism.  The allies are defined by traditional international alliances and 
agreements as well as the perceptions of the insurgent.  The United States has called upon 
many old and new allies for support in the war on terrorism.  President George W. Bush 
has further attempted to induce support and polarize the issue with statements like “you 
are either with us, or with the terrorists.”74  Additionally the insurgent has defined the 
European states as members of the COIN force (assuming the website declaration of a 
“bloody war” referenced above is a true reflection of the AQN leadership’s desires).  In 
                                                 74 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” speech given 
September 2001; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; 
accessed 22 October 2004. 
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the eyes of the insurgent the European states have chosen the side of the COIN force by 
failing to remove their troops from Muslim countries.   
c. The Population 
The population refers to the global population.  Within the global 
population there are focus groups whose support is critical to both sides.  One critical 
focus group is the Umma (Muslim community of the faithful).  The Umma is the primary 
community that the AQN relies on for support;75 therefore it is “key terrain” within the 
global population.  The non-Muslim population remains critical in the battle for 
legitimacy and broader global support.  Both forces rely on popular support to legitimize 
their actions.  The AQN targets the population (Muslim or not) to influence their 
perceptions in an attempt to break the Coalition’s national will to continue the struggle.  
This is similar, for example, to the intra-state insurgency in Malaya from 1948-1960.  In 
Malaya the communist Chinese were the critical support base for the insurgents, similar 
to the Umma for the AQN.  While the communist Chinese were an important focus 
group, the entire population of Malaya was critical to the conduct of the counter 
insurgency.  So while many efforts were directed at the Chinese in Malaya, all actions 
were made with consideration to the effects on the entire population.  Thus the 
communist Chinese became a focus group within the Malayan population.  So while the 
Umma may be a critical focus group within the population, the global population as a 
whole remains the center of gravity in the global insurgency. 
d. The International Community 
The International Community is defined as the State and non-State leaders 
or organizations that have influence over large segments of the population but do not 
actively or passively support either the AQN or the Coalition.  The State leaders are the 
recognized governments throughout the world.  A state government is a member of the 
                                                 75 The AQN is willing to accept support from non-Muslim communities, but the primary support base 
is the Umma.  In his 1996 “Declaration of War” bin Laden says that “If it is not possible to fight except 
with the help of non righteous military personnel and commanders, then there are two possibilities: either 
fighting will be ignored and the others, who are the great danger to this life and religion, will take control; 
or to fight with the help of non righteous rulers and therefore repelling the greatest of the two dangers and 
implementing most, though not all, of the Islamic laws.”  This is perhaps how he justified support from the 
United States and other “Infidel” countries during the Afghanistan war against the Soviets.  Now he is 
attempting to implement the Islamic law in the rest of the world.  He used U.S. aid to defeat the Soviets 
(“the greatest of the two dangers”) and is now turning to rid the world of the rest of the threat to “this life 
and religion.”   
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International Community because they have influence over their population and have the 
authority to mobilize (or abstain from mobilizing) forces in support of either the 
Insurgent or COIN forces.  Additionally a state government has the capacity to influence 
decisions within recognized international organizations, like the UN, NATO, or OAS.  
Non-State leaders are the organizational leaders that do not have a voice in recognized 
international diplomatic organizations, but still have the capability to influence large 
portions of a population or the international community, and in some cases mobilize 
forces.  For example, decisions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) can have a significant impact on the international economy and can influence 
popular opinion.  Other non-state members of the International Community would 
include religious organizations, international corporations, and other national and 
international organizations whose influence transcends state boundaries.76    
2. Strategic Analysis 
The AQN strategy has been one of attacking/influencing any and all weaknesses 
of the U.S. and its allies.  “In targeting the United States, al Qaeda will kill as many 
Americans as possible in as many attacks as it can carefully prepare and execute.”77  The 
AQN is following a strategy of “death by a thousand cuts” to slowly bleed out its enemy 
to defeat its forces and, more importantly, erode the national will to continue the fight.  
The 9/11 attacks were designed to strike at the political and economic (materialistic) 
heart of the United States.  The AQN felt that only an attack of that magnitude could 
attract the attention of the U.S. population and potentially change U.S. foreign policy.   
In addition to physical attacks, the AQN is maintaining a consistent assault on the 
perceptions of the population.  The use of suicide attackers is “an especially convincing 
way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come...one that suggests that the attackers 
                                                 76 The Vatican can serve as a good example for both a state and non-state member of the International 
community.  The Vatican is a “state” member of the International community in so far as it has signed 
treaties with Italy acknowledging its sovereignty as an independent state and has a diplomatic corps (The 
Holy See) with non-member voting privileges in the United Nation.  The Vatican’s “non-state” member 
characteristics evolve out of its influence over Catholics worldwide.  About 1 billion people worldwide 
profess the Catholic faith, indicating an influence that crosses international borders.  Influence on over 1 
billion people make it a valuable ally for any force.  For more information on the Holy See (Vatican City) 
see the CIA World Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vt.html, accessed 19 
October 2004.   
77 Anonymous, Through our Enemies’ Eyes, 230. 
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could not have been deterred...”78  The psychological message to the population is that 
there is no end to this war without the appeasement of the AQN demands.  The AQN also 
continuously restates the justification for its actions and reinforces its legitimacy; never 
forgetting that “persuasion is the ultimate purpose of every action.”79  The AQN 
message is based in Tugwell’s mobilizing trinity: the AQN cause is based on faith in 
Islam and righteous in the eyes of Allah, the Coalition are Kufr and are therefore evil in 
the eyes of Allah, the will of Allah makes victory inevitable.80   
The U.S. historically approached terrorism as a police responsibility to be 
investigated by the FBI.  “Our government was looking for individuals to arrest, extradite 
and prosecute in criminal courts.”81  USD(P) Feith goes on to say that  
President Bush broke with that practice - and with that frame of mind - 
when he decided that 9/11 meant that we are at war.  He decided that the 
US would respond not with the FBI and U.S. attorneys, but with our 
armed forces and every instrument of U.S. national power. 
Military historian Victor Davis Hanson characterized this approach as a “tripartite 
strategy...: kill or capture the al-Qaeda purveyors of death; end renegade regimes...; and 
promote democratic reform in the Middle East.”82  The military is executing this strategy 
by hunting for AQN leadership world wide and, thus far, removing two renegade regimes 
(the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Hussein regime in Iraq); while placing considerable 
resources towards promoting democratic reforms.  This military strategy is designed to 
provide a relatively quick conclusion to the conflict by executing a coup de main blow to 
the AQN.  Removal of the AQN leadership will cause the break up of the network and 
elimination of the global threat.  Removal of renegade regimes will deny the AQN safe  
                                                 78 Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review Vol 
97, No. 3 (August 2003): 343-61. 
79 Maurice Tugwell, “Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy,” Psychological Operations and Political 
Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 70. 
80 Ibid., 74.  Tugwell’s mobilizing trinity is based on the concept that followers will fight or resist so 
long as three essential beliefs are held: “First, a belief in something good to be promoted or defended.  
Second, a belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted.  Third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the 
good cause.” pp. 70-74.   
81 Douglas Feith 
82 Victor Davis Hanson, “Country at a Crossroads,” National Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 21 (November 
2004): 32-34 
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havens and critical resource support.  This is a throwback to the traditional conventional 
U.S. military way of conducting wars; utilizing “technological overmatch”83 to defeat the 
opponent.   
Missing from current Coalition efforts is a robust information campaign designed 
to: deny recruitment to the AQN, prevent the re-emergence of the threat when/if the 
current network is destroyed, and justify Coalition operations providing legitimacy 
through popular and international community support.  While the AQN message is 
repeated consistently, the Coalition has failed to shape global perceptions.  The Coalition 
leaves its actions to speak for themselves, rather than explaining the purpose behind the 
actions.  This means that the Coalition is influencing the “body”, but not the “mind” of 
the opponent and more importantly the population.  Additionally, not explaining its 
actions leaves a window of opportunity for the AQN to explain the Coalition actions in a 
way that benefits the AQN.   
The more active and intrusive U.S. military forces are in Islam the easier it 
is for the insurgency to make a truly compelling case for jihad, increase 
popular support, and put pressure on skittish Arab regimes.84 
The Coalition lack of justification and responses to AQN explanations causes the 
population and international community to question Coalition legitimacy.   
a. Strategy 1 - Struggle for Support of the Population 
Noted terrorism/insurgency experts Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw 
state: 
Terrorists and insurgents cannot ultimately succeed against the 
government without support from the general population; when the 
government responds effectively to the political and economic needs of 
the population85, insurgency and terrorism have a much less fertile 
environment in which to grow.  When, however, the government is not 
responsive, if its interests and the population’s are completely immutable 
                                                 83 Robert M. Cassidy, “Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and 
other Small Wars,” Parameters (Summer 2004): 73-83. 
84 Michael Vlahos, Terror’s Mask, 18. 
85 Also include “religious needs” to the list.  In the case of the Umma, the political and economic 
responses must be provided, while also catering to the religious needs of the community.  In other words, 
the political and economic responses must be integrated with the religious ideology of the general 
population.  A political and/or economic system can not be embraced if it does not fit within the religious 
system the general population adheres to. 
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and popular dissatisfaction is allowed to grow with few or no political 
concessions offered, terrorists or insurgents are more likely to find both 
active and tacit antigovernment support within the population.  This will 
severely compromise intelligence-gathering and can also be exploited for 
propaganda purposes by the terrorist or insurgent.86 
This section will start by addressing the target audiences and current strategies used by 
the AQN and Coalition in the struggle for popular support.  The second section will 
address three key components of the struggle for popular support: the information war, 
control, and legitimacy.  Strategy 1 is a broad category, but the three focus areas 
concentrate on the means and critical needs that Strategy 1 must address.   
The AQN is focusing its efforts on gaining the popular support of the 
Umma.  The struggle, as defined by the insurgent, is not political or diplomatic but 
religious (although the religious objectives have political implications as well), therefore 
support from the Umma is critical to the AQN’s ability to survive and operate.  The 
emphasis of the AQN on the non-Muslim population of the world has been to deter 
support to the Coalition (this will be discussed further under Strategy 2 below).  The 
Umma provides the AQN with resources, recruits, security, and legitimacy.  These are 
the essential requirements for the continued existence of the insurgency.   
The Coalition does not have the luxury of focusing on one segment of the 
global population for support; it must focus on the entire global population.  The Umma 
is the critical link to the AQN; without the Umma’s support the intelligence required to 
identify and locate the AQN cannot be obtained and legitimacy within the Muslim 
community will not be achieved.  Specific intelligence on the AQN is essential to permit 
discriminate targeting and to avoid the tactic of mass reprisals.  Discriminate targeting 
must be used to prevent collateral damage which has a negative effect on popular 
support.  Mass reprisals and/or indiscriminate targeting will lead the Coalition into the 
self defeating spiral experienced by the IDF in Lebanon.  Non-Muslim popular support is 
critical to the Coalition to prevent the (re)emergence of insurgent 
sanctuaries/sympathizers and provide the legitimacy necessary to continue the long term 
counterinsurgency struggle.   
                                                 86 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and 
Insurgency, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), vi. 
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The AQN’s strategy for gaining/maintaining popular support is aimed at 
presenting the conflict as one of Islam vs. evil.  This appeals to the Umma on a religious 
ideological level and makes participation in the conflict the “ultimate level of believing in 
the religion.”87  Participation in the insurgency and support to the AQN becomes the 
“duty of every Muslim in this world.”88 
The Coalition’s strategy for gaining/maintaining popular support is aimed 
at presenting the conflict as one of freedom and democracy vs. oppression.  This is an 
appeal for self determination on a political ideological level.  While this is a powerful 
argument, it does not directly confront the religious ideological appeal from the AQN.  
Just as the AQN is able to choose the time and place for physical attacks, the AQN is also 
defining the battlespace for the ideological struggle.  The Coalition must address the 
conflict within the same spectrum that the AQN is pursuing.  This means that the 
Coalition must address the conflict from the religious ideological perspective as well, 
demonstrating how the Coalition’s actions are in the best interest of the Umma from a 
religious ideological perspective.  The current strategy has a strong message for gaining 
non-Muslim support, but it fails to have the same impact on portions of the Umma.   
Information War and Perception Management 
Coalition information operations must have a global focus to be 
successful.  An example of the U.S.’s locally, rather than globally, focused information 
campaign was given by LTC Yadi, a Malaysian Army officer.89  LTC Yadi commented 
that the U.S. population has been convinced of al Qaeda’s role in the September 11th 
attacks, but much of the world (especially the Umma) has not been afforded the same 
“proof” and are still not convinced.  A large part of the world population still doubting al  
                                                 87 Bin Laden, “Declaration of War.” 
88 Ibid. 
89 LTC Yadi highlighted this point during a class discussion at the Naval Postgraduate School, May 
2004.  LTC Yadi was speaking as a representative of the foreign community, while he understands al 
Qaeda’s role in the 9/11 attacks, he was highlighting the fact that there are many portions of the population 
that have not received the same information.  Similar points can be found in multiple media reports. 
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Qaeda’s role in the attacks indicates a significant failure of the Coalition’s information 
operations and a potential inability to counter “the widespread ideological support for 
terrorism?”90   
The United States has begun to address the U.S. population through 
legislation and limited attempts at influencing the public.  Once again the U.S. plan is 
focusing locally rather globally.  Responses to a global threat must be a unified effort 
from the allies, coalitions, and alliance organizations (i.e. United Nations, NATO, EU, 
OAS...) within the Coalition.91  A shift in information operations from local to global 
“public trust and support” has to occur.  As the 9/11 report recommends: 
The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin 
Ladin’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion.  It is among the 
large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform, 
freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even though our own promotion of 
these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its 
carriers. (537) 
The 9/11 Report wisely identifies the foreign population as a critical target 
and the necessity for a trusted channel to transmit the Coalition message.  The message 
must be presented through foreign governments, religious leaders, and media outlets to 
ensure both an effective channel of communication and target audience trust in the 
message.  As the 9/11 report indicates, the link with the United States automatically 
creates bias toward the message in the target audience.92   
AQN influence operations have been directed at their target audience in 
both channel and message.  For example, Al Jazeera has become a relatively trusted news 
source in the Middle East, especially with the proliferation of satellite television in the 
region.  The AQN has used the network as the forum to present its messages.  This means 
the Umma is receiving the message from a trusted source, providing additional credibility 
to message content.  The AQN message is also consistent, it is always based in the 
                                                 90 Douglas Feith, 5. 
91 International legislation would fall under the realm of “Involving the International Community”, 
but there effects would be felt on the global population so they are a combination of both Strategies 1 and 
5. 
92 This portion of the campaign could be greatly enhanced through coordination with the broader DOS 
campaign in the Battle of ideas.  This is just one example of how the two campaigns will continually 
reinforce one another. 
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Islamic struggle and all actions are designed to reinforce this message.  Additionally, the 
AQN addresses the Coalition message, portraying the Coalition as lacking in consistency 
and equality.  An example of this is the AQN’s questioning of Coalition human rights 
policies.  “All false claims and propaganda [by the Coalition] about ‘Human Rights’ were 
hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in 
every part of the world.”93  While the Coalition is claiming to operate for equal and fair 
treatment for everyone, the AQN claims the Coalition actions are strictly based on self 
interest without consideration for human rights. 
Intelligence, Security, and thus Control94 
Another key point brought out in the earlier Hoffman and Taw quote (as 
well as from the case study in Chapter IV) is the necessity of the local population’s 
support for intelligence.  The population is critical for gaining the intelligence required to 
conduct operations.  The NSCT addresses many of the characteristics required for an 
effective intelligence structure.  The National Strategy states, “the United States must not 
only rely on technical intelligence, but renew its emphasis on other types of intelligence 
needed to get inside the organization” (p. 16).  RAND researchers Leites and Wolf say 
that to counter an insurgency “requires a highly developed intelligence system.”95  The 
focus on intelligence is critical, and the U.S. has the world’s best technical intelligence 
system, but the AQN are adapting and evading Coalition technological collection 
capabilities.  This means that the emphasis on “other types of intelligence,” especially 
human intelligence, becomes more vital to the success of the Coalition. 
The AQN is very effective at gaining the popular support required for 
intelligence, resources, and recruits.  The Coalition has even identified AQN 
infiltrators/informants within the U.S. military.96  This indicates that in certain cases the 
                                                 93 Usamah bin Laden, Declaration of War.  
94 Dr. Gordon McCormick defines control as: Nothing occurs that I can’t see; there is nothing I see 
that I can’t influence.  This implies seeing everything, which no one person can do.  Therefore to be able to 
control an area you must have eyes everywhere, which can only be accomplished with the support of the 
surrounding population.  That control then provides the intelligence to act, and the security (early warning) 
to prevent attacks.   
95 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflict, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 74. 
96 “Traitor in the ranks?” Navy Times, (23 August 2004).  The article says a disk containing “the e-
mail exchanges between Ahmed [a British national arrested for suspected terrorism] and Abujihaad 
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religious ideology of the AQN is successful in countering the ideology of what should be 
the most politically and nationally motivated members of the Coalition.  Conversely there 
have been very few, if any, “traitors” from within the core of the AQN.  The Coalition 
also operates in open societies making it easier for the AQN to gather intelligence. 
Popular support has provided al Qaeda leadership the security required to 
avoid capture.  The most glaring example of this is the continued evasion of Usamah bin 
Laden and other key leaders of al Qaeda.  The Coalition has dedicated large amounts of 
assets toward the capture of these key leaders.  There is also a $25 million reward for 
information leading to a capture.  Despite the efforts and incentives al Qaeda key leaders 
continue to avoid capture.  This indicates a high level of AQN control over the 
population; whether through loyalty or fear.  The population continues to protect the al 
Qaeda leaders and the core members of the AQN remain loyal to the cause.   
Legitimacy 
“Legitimacy, the senior British diplomat Robert Cooper has written, ‘is as 
much a source of power as force.’”97  The United States, as the lone superpower, has the 
capability to exert force anywhere in the globe; the only constraint on this capability is 
the legitimacy to wield this force.  Thus the most powerful nation in the world can be 
stopped if it does not have the legitimacy to use its force.  Legitimacy cannot be self 
provided, it can only come from the population and the international community.  This is 
why  
The United States can neither appear to be acting, nor in fact act, as if only 
its self-interest mattered... [T]he world’s sole superpower needs to 
demonstrate that it wields its great strengths on behalf of its principles and 
those who share them.98 
                                                 
[Destroyer Benfold crewmember] took place between late 2000 through 2001, with an individual who 
described himself as a Navy sailor on active duty in the Middle East.”  The emails contained classified 
information concerning the “composition of the Constellation carrier battle group, of which Benfold was a 
member, and details of its planned transit through the Strait of Hormuz.  The emails also “[voiced] enmity 
toward the ‘American enemies’” and “praises those who attacked the USS Cole and the ‘men who have 
brought honor this week to the ummah in the lands of Jihad...”  
97 Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 83, No. 2 (2004): 65-87. 
98 Ibid., 85. 
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Legitimacy provides the critical support to continue operating.  
Economically the United States can continue to fight the war alone.   
It is more doubtful, however, whether the American people will continue 
to support both military actions and the burdens of postwar occupations in 
the face of constant charges of illegitimacy by the United States’ closest 
democratic allies.99   
Without the legitimacy provided by the population and international community, a force 
can lose its support at home and abroad.  The Coalition is attempting to gain support of 
the global population (Strategy 1), while denying the AQN support from the Umma 
(Strategy 2).  Conversely, the AQN is attempting to gain support from the Umma 
(Strategy 1), while denying the Coalition support of the global population (Strategy 2). 
The battle for legitimacy is closely tied to the information war and 
perception management.  The Coalition and AQN require popular and international 
state/non-state support to provide legitimacy to their campaigns.  When the cause is no 
longer deemed legitimate in the eyes of the population, popular support disappears and 
the needs of the force go unfulfilled.  This is why both forces base their actions on 
providing for the population and say the opponent is acting in its own self-interests.  The 
Coalition portrays itself as acting on behalf of the political and economic freedom of the 
population.  The message, according to the NSCT, is that the Coalition will persevere 
until it “eliminates terrorism as a threat to our way of life”100 (selfless act) and the AQN 
is “evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of 
life”101 (self interest).  The AQN portrays itself as acting on behalf of the religious 
livelihood of the population.  The AQN message is “aimed at defending sanctity and 
religion”102 (selfless act) and the Coalition is “occupying the lands of Islam..., 
plundering its riches..., humiliating its people...”103 (self interest).   
 
                                                 99 Ibid. 
100 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 29. 
101 Ibid., 1. 
102 Usamah bin Laden, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 23 February 1998.  Available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm; accessed 26 October 2004.   
103 Ibid. 
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b. Strategy 2 - Separation of the Opponent and the Population 
The AQN campaign focuses on portraying the Coalition as crusaders 
fighting to expand control.  The purpose is to influence primarily the global population to 
deny support to the Coalition because it is waging an illegitimate campaign.  The AQN is 
addressing the political spectrum - expanding dominance of the Coalition - to ensure the 
message influences the target audience - the global population.  Thus the AQN messages 
are designed to gain support (Strategy 1) from the Umma using religious ideology and to 
deny support (Strategy 2) to the Coalition from the global population using political 
rationality.  Rather than working with and for the population the Coalition is portrayed as 
imposing its will on the population.  For the AQN, it is critical that the population 
believes the Coalition’s actions are motivated by greed and fear.   
While terrorism is an offensive tactic, the AQN portrays itself as fighting a 
defensive battle.  The portrayal of a defensive jihad accomplishes two important tasks.  
First, it serves to provide legitimacy to the jihad by depicting it as a last resort response 
against an aggressor that could not be avoided.  Second, it depicts the campaign as 
defensive and therefore legitimate within Islam, because “Islam cannot justify aggressive 
war.”104  Framing the battle as one for Islam serves to gain support from the Umma 
(Strategy 1) and ensures the Umma denies support to the Coalition (Strategy 2).  A 
devout Muslim cannot provide support to the Coalition without betraying Allah and Islam 
since the Coalition is waging a war against Islam.   
The Coalition strategy focuses on portraying the AQN as terrorists 
fighting an illegitimate campaign.  In this campaign political ideology and the recognized 
rules of conduct within the international political system are the basis for legitimacy.  The 
Coalition is attempting to prevent popular support for the AQN by portraying the AQN 
campaign as one that is acting outside the legitimate international system.  The label of 
“terrorist groups of global reach” is in itself an attempt to separate the AQN from the 
population.  Terrorism is an inherently illegitimate cause that cannot be supported 
without betraying the recognized government, international agreements, and accepted 
                                                 104 Ira G. Zepp, A Muslim Primer: A Beginner’s Guide to Islam 2d edition (Fayetteville, AK: 
University of Arkansas Press, 2000), 96. 
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forms of public diplomacy.  Therefore a good citizen must provide support to the 
Coalition (Strategy 1) and deny support to the AQN (Strategy 2). 
What the population perceives as motivations is the critical factor.  The 
population must be convinced that all actions are taken on their behalf and in their best 
interests or popular support will be given to the opponent.  If the population does not see 
the prospect for a better future from one sides cause, support will be given to the 
opponent.  Both sides are fighting for what they believe to be a legitimate cause, the 
perceived motivations will determine who receives popular support.  The Coalition is 
appealing to the political and economic rationality of the population to deny support to 
the AQN.  The AQN is appealing to the political and religious rationality of the 
population to deny support to the Coalition.  Both approaches have an effect within the 
Umma and non-Muslim populations, but the AQN religious ideology reaches the Umma 
at the level of their core values and individual identity. 
c. Strategy 3 - Direct Action Against the Opponent 
The Coalition approach to the counterinsurgency appears to rely heavily 
on a kill/capture strategy.  Each member of the AQN, and especially the key leaders, 
killed or captured is a measure of success in the campaign.  This approach is exemplified 
in the NSCT under defeat where goals will be obtained by attacking there sanctuaries, 
leadership, and infrastructure.  The NSCT identifies “the final element to the Defeat goal 
is an aggressive, offensive strategy...” (17). 
The NSCT also says that the use of direct action to defeat the enemy 
cannot be initiated until the AQN are “identified and located” (17).  Therefore, aggressive 
military operations cannot be initiated until critical intelligence is obtained.  Forces 
cannot strike blindly without losing popular support, so while forces are prepared to 
implement the kill/capture strategy they cannot perform effectively until they have the 
required intelligence.  A focus on direct action leads to stagnant forces waiting for 
intelligence, rather than integrating with the population to gain the required intelligence.  
Robert D. Kaplan points to the Coalition return to a direct action focus in Afghanistan 
following initial success with unconventional tactics as self defeating.  “We [the 
Coalition] have become the Soviets [in Afghanistan].  We are hunkered down in firebases 
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and get picked at by insurgents who freely move in and out of Pakistan.”105  The 
Coalition must approach the use of military force globally, as it did locally in 
Afghanistan, small elements working with local groups to assist in their struggle against 
the AQN. 
The Coalition use of direct action has served to reduce the support from 
both the population and the international community.  The majority of the global 
population viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as a legitimate response to the attacks of 
11 September 2001.  Much of the global population and international community have 
viewed the invasion of Iraq as illegitimate because the justification for the operation was 
not proven, WMD have not been located.  “The moral argument, not whether WMD is 
present is the way to frame any discussion of the former Iraqi regime.”106  Framing the 
removal of the Iraqi regime as a “moral argument” continues to emphasize to the global 
population and the international community the legitimacy behind the need for direct 
action and provides a consistent message for all military action.  Tying the operation to 
WMD has undermined support; when WMD were not found the legitimacy for the 
operation was removed.  Direct action cannot be executed without considerations for its 
implications on the population and international community.  While the operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have “heavily strained, if not completely destroyed”107 the AQN’s 
initial strategic concept and forced the AQN to adapt; the AQN has capitalized on their 
losses by exploiting the Coalition operations through propaganda and media outlets, 
turning tactical losses into strategic gains. 
The AQN uses direct action to counter the Coalition and ensure continued 
dissemination of their message, but - like Hizballah in the 1980’s - they do it with a 
combination of specific targets and religious approval.  The AQN targets are traditionally 
symbolic in nature to demonstrate the continued struggle against the enemies of Islam.  
Religious approval comes through the many fatwa’s presented by the AQN.  These 
factors combine to demonstrate that the AQN use of direct action is not intended as much 
                                                 105 Robert Kaplan. 
106 Ibid. 
107 James S. Robbins, “Defeating Networked Terrorism,” in Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the new 
Security Environment, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), 
75. 
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to defeat the Coalition as to influence the population.  The Attacks on 9/11 were a 
traumatic blow to the United States both in the cost of human life and economic 
disruption, but it would take multiple attacks of that magnitude to threaten the continued 
existence of the Nation.  Additionally the AQN would have to conduct similar attacks on 
many other countries around the world to destroy the Coalition (although the destruction 
of the United States is viewed as the first step toward defeating the Coalition).  The goal 
of the AQN was to deliver a blow to the United States, but more importantly to send a 
message to the population.  The message is designed to gain the support of the Umma 
and produce fear (coerce) the populations of countries opposed to the AQN.  This was 
done effectively in Spain where the March 2004 train bombings successfully influenced 
the removal of Spanish troops from Iraq.   
d. Strategy 4 - Separation of the Opponent and the International 
Community 
The Coalition has made it clear that it will counter any support to the AQN 
from a state actor.  The removal of the former Iraqi regime has sent a clear deterrent 
message to state supporters of the AQN.  While states may question the capability of the 
Coalition to mount a large military response, there is no doubt that at a minimum political 
and economic pressure will be applied to AQN supporters.  Conversely, the message that 
support to the Coalition provides political and economic benefits is clear.  An example of 
this is Libya, following the resolution of the Lockerbie case and the agreement to disclose 
and end its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.  The UN sanctions on 
Libya were removed and the country is attempting to integrate into the international 
community, including application to the World Trade Organization.108  The Coalition 
has adopted a carrot or stick approach to influencing the state members of the 
international community.   
The Coalition efforts to deter non-state support for the AQN are 
unavoidably limited.  Many of the non-state actors supporting the AQN are terrorist 
organizations active in their respective global regions.  The Coalition can not afford to 
address them directly, for fear of lending legitimacy to their cause; the byproduct of 
acknowledgement from a recognized state actor.  While the Coalition cannot afford to 
                                                 108 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Libya,” The World Factbook, last updated 19 October 2004; 
Available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ly.html; accessed 29 October 2004. 
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legitimize terrorist organizations, there are other non-state members of the international 
community that must be addressed to counter the AQN strategy 4 efforts.  The AQN 
legitimacy is based in religious ideology, as such the Coalition must counter the AQN in 
the same battlespace.  The Coalition must demonstrate how its message of freedom and 
democracy is in line with Islam instead of counter to it.  Only Muslims leaders, especially 
the Ulema (learned scholars in Islamic law and teaching and thus leaders in the Islamic 
community), are capable of convincing the Muslim community of this point.  Many of 
the Ulema have denounced the violent tactics of the AQN as un-Islamic,109 but the 
message has not been seized upon and reinforced by the Coalition.  Additionally, 
moderate Muslim governments and international organizations must be encouraged to 
reinforce their messages against the AQN.   
The AQN focus is to de-legitimize the Coalition operations in the eyes of 
the international community.  There is a direct correlation between the size of the 
Coalition and the AQN’s freedom of action and mobility.  AQN freedom of action and 
mobility increases the smaller the group that comprises the Coalition becomes.  Each 
state that questions the legitimacy of the Coalition provides a twofold effect for the AQN.  
First, that state is no longer a participant in the Coalition reducing the size of the 
coalition.  Second, that state is now actively questioning the actions of the Coalition, 
diverting Coalition time and resources from the fight with the AQN to justifying their 
actions.  The AQN has achieved this effect through the media by continually questioning 
the legitimacy of the Coalition actions.  This is where the Coalition information 
operations are failing; the counter points to the AQN messages are not being conducted in 
the same channel (if at all) that the AQN is utilizing.  Therefore the people that the AQN 
reaches are not the ones that the Coalition is reaching.   
The AQN understands the Coalition requirement for state support and uses 
military action and threats to reach the states that support the legitimacy of the Coalition 
                                                 109 For examples of this see: “Pakistan Muslim Clerics Issue Fatwa against Sectarian Killings”, 
Associated Press of Pakistan news agency, 3 June 2004, http://www.nexis.com; accessed 7 November 
2004..  “Ulema condemns killing of innocent Christians,” Pakistan Press International, the Pakistan 
Newswire, 3 November 2001, http://www.nexis.com, accessed 7 November 2004.  “Saudi Muslim leaders 
condemn terror attacks on non-Muslims,” Agence France Presse -- English, 14 June 2004, 
http://www.nexis.com, accessed 7 November 2004.  “Public Statements by Senior Saudi Officials 
condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation,” May 2004, available from 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/Report_Extremism_May04.pdf; accessed 8 November 2004. 
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(i.e. provide active and passive support to the Coalition).  Examples of this at the local 
level can be seen in Iraq with the ransoming of hostages for the removal of troops.  On 
the global level this can be seen in bin Laden’s October 2004 statement.  “Your security 
is in your own hands. Each and every state that does not tamper with our security will 
have automatically assured its own security.”110  The AQN is using terrorist acts and the 
threat of terrorist attacks as a means to deter state involvement in the Coalition.   
The use of direct action by the Coalition has also provided the AQN with 
an abundance of propaganda to exploit.  The invasion of Iraq, for example, is constantly 
being framed by the AQN as an illegitimate unilateral action, but the Coalition has not 
responded in the foreign media to justify its actions.  So while in the U.S. the justification 
is made (and only influencing a portion of the population), other key target audiences are 
not given any counter to the information the AQN presents.  An example of a more 
effective operation is the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1SFG(A)) actions during 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.  The combined operations of the Philippine 
military and 1SFG(A) were focused on gaining trust and building contacts within the 
local population, which were effective enough to negate the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) 
influence.  These actions “got the Filipino media reporting positively about the U.S. 
forces, something that hadn’t happened since before the closing of the bases there.”111  
This is an example of strategic victory because the Coalition succeeded and did not have 
to justify its actions; the local media did it for them.112   
e. Strategy 5 - Involving the International Community 
The Coalition, as a coalition of state actors, must work within the confines 
of international law, a restriction that does not concern the AQN.  Coalition legitimacy of 
action can only be achieved through operations that are in accordance with these laws.  
This means that it is critical for the Coalition to gain the support of the international 
community to counter the global AQN presence.  The Coalition must gain individual 
                                                 110 “Excerpts: Bin Laden video,” BBC News, UK edition, 29 October 2004; available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3966817.stm; Internet; accessed 31 October 2004. 
111 Robert. D. Kaplan. 
112 The Philippine example further reinforces the effectiveness of the McCormick COIN Model.  The 
JTF-510 Commander, BG Donald Wurster, briefed that the strategic intent for the operation was based on 
an earlier example of the McCormick COIN Model.  The briefing was given at the 8-10 July 2003 SOF 
Education Conference at JSOU, Hurlburt Field, FL. 
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state support where there is an AQN presence to counter the threat and where there is no 
AQN presence to prevent its emergence.   
In addition to providing legitimacy, nation states also serve as force 
multipliers in the fight against the AQN.  In an intra-state insurgency the federal 
government normally does not have the capability to monitor every region in the country; 
it must work through and/or with the local governments to ensure control in those 
regions.  In the global insurgency the Coalition does not have the capability to monitor 
every country in the globe; it must work through and/or with each state government to 
provide control in their “local” region.  As the NSCT says: 
Where states are willing and able, we will reinvigorate old partnerships 
and forge new ones... Where states are weak but willing, we will support 
them vigorously... Where states are reluctant, we will work with our 
partners to convince them to change course and meet their international 
obligations.  Where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter 
the threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting 
terrorism. (12) 
The National Strategy addresses the need to foster relationships with regional partners.  
Working through allies, agents, or surrogates is a critical means of gaining the required 
intelligence to counter the global insurgent.  As the NSCT correctly states “our regional 
partners are often better poised than the United States to gain access to information and 
intelligence” (16).  The Coalition, as the coalition stands today, does not have the 
capability to penetrate or the manpower to actively operate in every region of the world.  
Fostering relationships world wide will allow the Coalition to act in conjunction with 
local military, police, and intelligence systems.  The United States is not alone in the 
global war on terrorism and by fostering international relationships can operate more 
efficiently and effectively.   
USD(P) Feith’s speech discussed “striking them [the terrorists] abroad 
where they do so much of their recruiting, training, equipping and planning” (p. 4).   This 
shows a proper global focus for the U.S. strategy, but execution not intent is the critical 
factor.  The U.S. must take action through and/or with local state governments to be able 
to “strike them abroad.”  Successful examples of this can be seen in Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Colombia, the Horn of Africa, and other regions around the world, but the 
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effort must continue to expand.  The Coalition must maintain its global perspective to 
counter the terrorist threat.  An international focus allows the Coalition to assist local 
governments to counter the AQN in their country; this is in both the respective country 
and Coalition’s best interests.  By working in conjunction with local forces, the Coalition 
continues to expand, reducing the freedom of action and mobility of the AQN.  Providing 
security and intelligence assistance is a force multiplier that reduces the burden on the 
current Coalition military and civilian personnel.   
The AQN focus concerning state actors in the international community is 
Strategy 4.  As a non-state actor they are operating outside the recognized norms of 
international law, which limits the AQN ability to form alliances with recognized states.  
Any state discovered forming an alliance with the AQN must consider the ramifications 
of their actions.  The Coalition and international organizations have shown a willingness 
to take action against states supporting the AQN.  A state supporter of the AQN knows 
that it will face political and economic sanctions as well as possible military action.  
While there are states that favor the AQN cause over the Coalition, there are very few 
that see the benefit of supporting the AQN as greater than the costs that support, if 
discovered, will incur.  Indicating the Coalition is more successful at deterring state 
support (Strategy 4) then the AQN is at gaining state support (Strategy 5) 
Thus, the AQN main focus is on gaining the support of non-state actors.  
Muslim groups and terrorist organizations are often the target of efforts to expand the 
AQN global presence.  So while the AQN is not focusing on nation state support, it is 
attempting to build a global presence through the Muslim communities of the world.  
Additionally al Qaeda is attempting to become a player in ongoing international conflicts; 
participation in these conflicts will reinforce the al Qaeda’s self appointed role as the 
global defenders of Islam.  For example, al Qaeda declared responsibility for the attacks 
on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya in an attempt to influence the Palestine-
Israeli conflict.  They also declare support for the Muslim fighters in Chechnya, Bosnia-




C. ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE STRATEGIES 
Strategy 1:  Struggle for Support of the Population 
Increased focus on the religious ideological support for the AQN.  The Coalition 
strategy must address the religious ideological appeal of the AQN message.  The 
population must understand that the Coalition goals are to provide freedom and 
democracy in conjunction with religious beliefs, rather than instead of them.  The AQN 
currently controls the religious ideological spectrum.  The Coalition must counter the 
AQN message by working with the Ulema to oppose the perception that the Coalition 
goals are anti-Islamic.  Crafting a campaign that emphasizes religious unity and 
highlights the non-Islamic practices of the AQN will slowly undermine the AQN’s most 
critical support base.  The strategy “must aim to stem the flow of people into the ranks of 
the terrorists.  Doing this requires a focus on the widespread ideological support for 
terrorism.”113 
Globally focused influence operations.  The Coalition information war must 
maintain a global focus.  The message presented by the Coalition must be conducted 
through an effective channel that will reach the target audience.  The message must also 
be consistent with the actions of the Coalition.  In the Middle East a critical 
communications channel is television, the Coalition must have Arab speaking 
representatives presenting its message in a way that directly reaches the Umma.  The 
spokesmen can be from the U.S. State Department, representatives of Moderate/allied 
Muslim governments, like minded Ulema, or ideally all of the above.  The message must 
be presented from a unified front.  Connection with the United States has a negative 
effect on the message, therefore the more “neutral” spokesmen utilized the greater the 
acceptance.  A broader acceptance of the message will have the added effect of 
increasing legitimacy to the Coalition cause. 
Increased emphasis on non-technical methods of intelligence gathering, 
specifically HUMINT.  Hoffman and Taw say that “human intelligence (HUMINT) is 
especially important in terrorism or insurgency, where the enemy is indistinguishable 
                                                 113 Douglas Feith. 
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from the general population.”114  The AQN has demonstrated the capability to evade 
Coalition technical intelligence collection methods.  This indicates the necessity for 
increased non-technical methods, especially HUMINT.  Establishing HUMINT networks 
is a slow process, it takes time to identify and gain the trust of potential informants.  
Ideally the networks are in place prior to the need for them arising, rather than attempting 
to develop a network once a region is identified.  The Coalition must be pre-emptive in 
this aspect of the intelligence system; establishing global networks early to deny safe 
havens and/or track AQN movements.  Only through integrating with the general 
population can control be established over a particular area, especially when the opponent 
is indistinguishable form the general population.  Unlike conventional warfare where 
control is established by seizing terrain, in an insurgency control can only be established 
through the population.   
Strategy 2:  Separation of the Opponent and the Population 
Discredit AQN legitimacy at its Islamic core.  The message to deny AQN support 
of the Umma must be based in Islam.  The AQN message is based on these teachings and 
therefore must be countered at its roots.  The Coalition must present the AQN as waging 
a non-Islamic campaign.  This message can best be conducted with/through the Ulema 
and Islamic organizations to provide credibility.  Potential areas of emphasis include 
countering the legality of the AQN’s fatwa’s.   
Certain Muslim factions, in the name of self-interest, will engage in 
political struggle and call it jihad, but no individual or group can 
arbitrarily wage jihad.  Only the state, through its leaders - the caliph or 
imam - can authorize a holy war.115 
The purpose of this paper is to identify areas for strategic influence, not specific points of 
attack; that can be decided by those better suited for the task.  The reason fatwa’s were 
highlight is to demonstrate that there are ways to counter the AQN message at the core of 
its legitimacy.  It is by attacking this core that the most powerful and effective messages 
are made.   
                                                 114 Hoffman and Taw, 138. 
115 Ira G. Zepp, 97. Emphasis added. 
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Aggressively reinforce Coalition messages of freedom, democracy, and tolerance.  
In addition to undermining the AQN legitimacy, the Coalition must counter the AQN 
messages directed at the Coalition motivations.  Perceptions must be shaped so that the 
Coalition motivations do not continue to appear to be greed and fear.  If the Coalition is 
truly acting out of a desire to spread freedom, democracy, and tolerance, that message 
must be made clear to the population which includes ensuring the population understands 
what freedom and democracy provides. 
Strategy 3:  Direct Action Against the Opponent 
Base direct action efforts on their strategic influence rather than tactical impact.  
The Coalition is using direct action to tactically defeat the AQN.  Direct action must 
focus less on tactical defeat and become a tool for influencing the population to achieve 
strategic defeat.  The AQN is currently doing this with greater success.   
Large conventional forces cannot execute direct action effectively until the 
support of the population has been secured.  A small portion of the Coalition can be 
utilized to conduct direct attacks on the AQN, as long as their operations are used to 
support the overall campaign and do not detract from the main effort of 
influencing/controlling the population.  For example a small successful surgical strike 
against a key leader has significant influence on the population.  The capture of a key 
leader shows that the insurgent is not invincible and also serves to disrupt the AQN for 
fear of the intelligence the detainee may reveal.  The inherent danger in this tactic is that 
military operations can be exploited by the AQN for propaganda purposes.  Tactically 
successful military operations have been spun by the AQN into strategically damaging 
propaganda.116  Direct action operations must remain a supporting effort to the overall 
campaign.  The main effort of the Coalition must be to establish control.  Once control is 
established the AQN will be left with two alternatives: either disperse, hide, and survive 
or mount a final desperate attack and become easy targets for the more powerful and 
better resourced Coalition.  In either situation the AQN becomes an ineffective fighting 
force.  Direct action does not provide control; control provides the ability to conduct 
effective direct action.   
                                                 116 Examples of this can be seen in well planned and executed military operations that the IF claims 
killed innocent civilians or the often used attack on a “wedding party.” 
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Strategy 4:  Separation of the Opponent and the International Community 
Increased emphasis on the primary AQN support base in the International 
Community, the non-State actors.  The Coalition’s effective deterrent message to the state 
actors must also be applied to the non-state actors of the international community.  Non-
state actors, through their control of terrain, have the ability to provide safe havens and 
other support to the AQN.  Additionally they can provide the AQN access to potential 
targets, resources, and manpower.  The Coalition must deter non-state support to the 
AQN.  This is a much more difficult task, because the strength of international law and 
legitimacy do not affect many of the non-state actors.117  As non-state organization, many 
of them are operating beyond international law, therefore threats of political and 
economic reprisals do not produce the desired coercive effect.  The cost of supporting the 
AQN must be raised to an unacceptable level to separate the non-state actors from the 
AQN.  The Coalition must increase the costs on the non-state actors that support the 
AQN.  The costs the non-state actor incurs for supporting the AQN must be shown to 
jeopardize the non-state actor’s objectives.  The Coalition can accomplish this by direct 
action, which runs the risk of decreased popular and international community opinion, or 
through intensified influence operations on the non-state actor’s support base.  Once 
again the center of gravity becomes the population.   
Work through and with allies, especially Muslim Governments/Organizations.  
The Coalition must identify moderate Muslim governments/organizations and provide 
them support.  This demonstrates that there are benefits to supporting the Coalition as 
well as provides an example that the Coalition is working with the Muslim community.  
This will further separate the AQN from the international community.  The Ulema and 
other Muslim representation can play a key role in influencing the international 
community, just as in influencing the population.   
 
 
                                                 117 As non-state actors many of the organization are operating outside of international law already, 
therefore breaking additional international laws is a minor concern.  These organizations’ legitimacy does 
not come from the international community.  Legitimacy is derived from their ideology (political or 
religious), therefore perceived legitimacy from the international community is of less concern than the 
perception of the population they are attempting to convince of their ideology.   
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Strategy 5:  Involving the International Community 
Continue to reinforce/expand State support for the Coalition.  The focus of the 
AQN on non-state support and Coalition on state support should not be a surprise.  The 
AQN, as a non-state actor, is focusing on gaining the support of other non-state members 
of the international community; just as the Coalition as a coalition of state actors is 
focused on support from state members.  The key to the international community is how 
each force reacts to the opponent’s strategy.  The AQN has identified the requirement of 
the Coalition for strong state support from the international community.  Therefore the 
AQN has used this information to drive their strategy to separate the opponent from the 
international community (Strategy 4).   
The Coalition must execute operations utilizing the principle of economy of force.  
Local forces (who then become part of the Coalition) must provide for their own 
sovereignty.  The local forces are also often better suited to execute the required 
operations, both in ability and with cultural sensitivity.  Additionally working through 
local governments can add legitimacy to the Coalition’s efforts and prevent the 
perception that the U.S. is imposing its will without consideration of the local 
government. 
Coalition Strategies must retain a global emphasis and appeal.  The NSCT is a 
statement to Americans that the government is trying to “protect not just the lives but the 
liberty of the American people” (Feith, p. 3).  The goal internationally is not to protect 
the American way of life, but to support stable governments to protect their own way of 
life.  The Coalition objective must be made clear.  The U.S., as the lead state in the 
Coalition, must ensure the statements it makes are framed such that they support the 
Coalition’s mission and apply to the global population and international community, not 
just Americans.  It must be understood that the U.S. objective is to support global 
stability, not impose the American way of life.  For example, the United States is not 
going to get the Pakistani government to fight terrorists to protect the American way of 
life.  Pakistani support will only be secured by demonstrating to the Pakistani government 
how countering the AQN in its territory will reinforce Pakistan’s national interests.  The  
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Pakistani forces must understand that they are operating directly in support of the 
Pakistani government and way of life, which indirectly supports the American way of 

















You must fight your adversary with the word, as well as with the sword.  
You must win the war of ideas, as well as the battle of bullets. 
From an article about the Legacy of Ronald Reagan118 
A. THE UTILITY OF THE MODEL 
The utility of analyzing the war on terrorism as a global insurgency is that it 
indicates a shift in the main emphasis for the conduct of the war.  The primary emphasis 
must shift to, and remain on, the population.  Rather than applying the majority of the 
coalition’s resources to countering the network directly, the global insurgency analysis 
indicates that focusing on the network’s support base and resources is a more effective 
method of defeating the AQN.  Gaining popular support strengthens the Coalition’s 
ability to counter the AQN, while simultaneously draining the network of its ability to 
operate; the most basic and essential needs go unfulfilled and the network will fail to 
retain a global influence. 
Another dynamic of a global counterinsurgency campaign is that all elements of 
national power must play a role.  The U.S. military’s mission is to fight and win the 
nation’s wars, but to fight an insurgency requires more than just the military.  A global 
counterinsurgency campaign requires an alternate strategic framework for the military 
and to be ultimately successful requires a new strategic focus for every element of 
national power.  Only through a unified and mutually supporting effort can an insurgency 
be defeated.  Military, diplomatic, economic, and legislative efforts all must be 
synchronized and united toward achieving the common overarching objective: the defeat 
of the insurgent and its underlying causes.     
The application of an insurgency/counterinsurgency perspective serves to 
diminish the distinction between the twofold enemy indicated in the 9/11 Commission 
Report: al Qaeda and the radical ideological movement.  The global insurgency 
perspective does not separate one from the other, the two combine to form a common 
enemy that requires a unified counter effort.  The AQN is the insurgent and radical 
                                                 118 Ariel Cohen, “The Global Warrior,” Tech Central Station, 8 June 2004 [journal online]; available 
from http://remotefarm.techcentralstation.com/060804J.html; Internet; accessed 25 November 2004. 
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Islamism is the ideology they use to rally support.  This would be similar to an intrastate 
insurgent espousing communism, or any other ideology of economic and/or social 
reform, to rally support against the recognized authority.  You cannot address the 
insurgent without also addressing the ideology. 
The main effort for the Coalition must be to gain popular support (Strategy 1).  
The indirect effect of gaining popular support is the denial of popular support to the AQN 
(Strategy 2).  The analysis highlights the AQN reliance on the population for continued 
existence and its ability to continue operating.  Therefore gaining popular support 
reinforces the Coalition efforts, while diminishing the AQN capabilities.  Gaining 
popular support is the key to dismantling the AQN.  First, popular support lends 
legitimacy to the conduct of operations, the legitimacy required to operate freely and 
effectively to counter the AQN.  Second, support of the population provides the 
necessary intelligence to locate the AQN members.  As popular support increases the 
AQN security decreases, they can no longer hide within the population.  The AQN 
members lose the ability to move and operate freely when they fear the population around 
them.  Third, without the population, the resources required for the AQN members 
subsistence and operations are no longer available.  Fourth, gaining popular support 
removes the recruitment base from the network, this reduces the AQN ability to 
regenerate and expand the network.  While gaining popular support is the main effort and 
most import consideration for conducting the global COIN campaign, it is also the most 
difficult.  It is a slow process, especially in regions where current support for the coalition 
is minimal.   
The secondary emphasis is on gaining support of the international community 
(Strategy 5).  Continued expansion of the coalition applies pressure on the AQN.  The 
broader the coalition the more effective it becomes.  Additionally, the AQN must be cut 
off from the resources that the international community can provide (Strategy 4).  No 
single nation has the strength, much less the authority, to counter the AQN everywhere it 
appears.  The coalition must continue to expand in order to apply pressure on the network 
globally.  Just as an intrastate COIN effort relies on local governments to control their 
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regions, the global COIN effort must rely on each country to provide “a strong, united 
international front against terrorism.”119   
The Coalition must limit the use of direct action against the AQN (Strategy 3).  
Effective use of direct action requires a high degree of intelligence on the target to 
minimize causing collateral damage.  Excessive force and/or collateral damage results in 
decreased popular and international community support.  The previous analyses indicate 
the use of excessive force only hinders the counterinsurgency effort.  All efforts to use 
direct action must be done with consideration for their effects on the main and secondary 
efforts. 
B. A WAY AHEAD 
This analysis of the war on terrorism as a global insurgency provides strategic 
planning recommendations for the war.  All of the recommendations are already ongoing 
in one form or another, the key to their successful implementation is a shift in emphasis.  
The current focus is on direct confrontation of the opponent and disruption of the 
network.  The analysis presented indicates the need to shift emphasis toward influencing 
the population and the international community.  This can be accomplished with three 
mutually supporting strategies for the campaign: Short Range Strategy - Interdict 
leadership/infrastructure, Mid Range Strategy - Global counter network, Long Range 
Strategy - Underlying Causes/War of Ideas. 
1. Short Range Strategy - Interdict leadership/infrastructure 
(Supporting Effort 1) 
Strategic recommendation addressed: 
• Base direct action efforts on their strategic influence rather than tactical impact. 
This strategy is a stop gap measure designed to provide development time for the 
mid and long range strategies.  The terrorists cannot be allowed to retain/regain the 
initiative.  Continued interdiction efforts will disrupt current terrorist planning and 
operations to ensure “the primary focus of the members of al Qaeda is survival.”120  
These operations are a supporting effort to the mid and long range strategies which focus 
on establishing control and defeating the terrorist threat, rather than to disrupt and attack.  
                                                 119 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 19. 
120 James S. Robbins, 76. 
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This strategy is a supporting effort and as such requires only a small portion of the overall 
military effort.  Small, highly mobile elements can maintain the pressure on the AQN, 
while the primary emphasis is on supporting the mid and long range strategies.   
2. Mid Range Strategy - Global Counter Network (Supporting Effort 2) 
Strategic recommendations addressed: 
• Increased emphasis on non-technical methods of intelligence gathering, 
specifically HUMINT. 
• Increased emphasis on the primary AQN support base in the International 
Community, the non-State actor. 
• Work through and with allies, especially Muslim Government/Organizations. 
• Continue to reinforce/expand State support for the Coalition. 
Dr. McCormick defined control as “seeing everything that occurs and being able 
to influence everything I see.”  To be able to see everything requires “eyes” everywhere 
and cannot be accomplished through strictly technical means.   The U.S. dominance in 
technical collection capabilities greatly enhances our ability to see everything, but against 
an opponent that can easily blend with the local population a Global HUMINT network 
of informants must be established.   
We need intelligence from the local civilians and soldiers from the area 
who understand the language, customs, and dynamics of the local 
situation, who can easily point out strangers in the area even though they 
speak the same language, but look different.121  
This does not mean that U.S. forces need to be operating in every country/region; local 
governments can, and must, provide for control in their own countries.  The exchange of 
training and information will facilitate the establishment and effectiveness of the counter 
network.   
To be able to “influence everything I see” indicates the ability to project force 
everywhere that there are “eyes.”  The projection of force can be from U.S. personnel on 
the ground, surrogate forces, an armed predator overhead, or many other methods.  The 
United States has the capability to project forces anywhere in the world, but for the 
counter network to be effective and efficient the time to project force must be minimal.  
                                                 121 Rick Webster, “Counterinsurgency: The John Paul Vann Model,” Sitrep, Winter/Spring 2004; 
available from http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/johnpaulvann.htm; Internet; accessed 28 
November 2004. 
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This means that the people running the network in a given region (whether U.S. or Allies) 
must have the capability and authority to act on intelligence immediately.  By achieving 
Dr. McCormick’s level of control in a region, that region is denied to the AQN.  
Terrorists entering the controlled region are monitored and either interdicted or tracked to 
develop further intelligence.   
3. Long Range Strategy - Underlying Causes/War of Ideas (Main Effort) 
Strategic recommendations addressed: 
• Increased focus on the religious ideological support for the AQN. 
• Globally focused influence operations. 
• Discredit AQN legitimacy at its Islamic core. 
• Aggressively reinforce Coalition messages of freedom, democracy, and tolerance. 
• Coalition strategies must retain a global emphasis and appeal. 
As USD(P) Feith states “the war on terrorism will never end if all we do is disrupt 
and attack terrorist networks.”122  The short and mid range strategies are designed to 
disrupt and control the terrorists.  The long range strategy focuses on the core ideological 
support to the terrorists.  As long as the population continues to provide support to the 
AQN, there will continue to be a threat to the United States.  To create an “international 
environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them”123 the United 
States must first address the underlying causes of the threat.  Only then can the threat be 
diminished.  “To win in a global battle of ideas, a global strategy for communicating 
those ideas is essential.”124 
All three strategies must be initiated simultaneously.  The mid and long range 
strategies require time before any sign of effectiveness becomes evident.  In the case of 
the war of ideas, results may be measured in generations rather than years.  A mid or long 
range strategy does not mean that it is initiated in the mid or long term future.  All three 
must be initiated immediately and prosecuted aggressively. 
                                                 122 Douglas J. Feith. 
123 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 11. 
124 Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
Communication,” September 2004, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-
Strategic_Communication.pdf (accessed 24 November 2004). 
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While these strategies are only one course of action for countering the Global 
Insurgency, the intent of highlighting them is to demonstrate a plan that maintains an 
emphasis on the population.  There are various ways to implement the strategies outlined 
by Dr. McCormick’s model; the key is to emphasize gaining and maintaining popular 
support for the campaign.   
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